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Abstract 
This thesis investigates speculation and risk management in the shipping industry in general 
represented by the use of a case study consisting of two dry bulk shipping companies. In 
addition, it focuses on the impact of the financial crisis on the dry bulk shipping industry.  
Shipping is one of the world’s most international and capital intensive industries, and has 
since the very beginning been characterised by cyclicality, seasonality and volatility. Volatility 
in general and the recent dry bulk collapse suggest that shipping is a high-risk industry in 
which risk management is rather important in order to avoid instability and unpredictability.  
There are five main risks that are of vital importance for shipowners and should thus be 
managed. These risks include freight rate risk, bunker price risk, exchange rate risk, interest 
rate risk and counterparty risk. There are several ways of managing these risks, and the most 
common is hedging through the use of derivative contracts such as futures, forwards, 
options and swaps. Market participants that actively manage risk with these instruments will 
experience reduced costs of financial distress and will be less exposed to short-term 
volatility than companies that stay un-hedged. In addition, by exploiting these tools, 
companies can obtain a competitive advantage by becoming more suited and prepared for 
unexpected ups and downs in the market. 
The results of the case study show that the two companies operate rather differently when 
it comes to risk management. Where Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA actively implements hedges 
against freight rate risk, bunker price risk, interest rate and currency risk, Golden Ocean 
Group Ltd does not. The only feature they have in common is that they both operate in the 
dry bulk industry and that they both trade Forward Freight Agreements to a certain degree. 
Other than that they differ in terms of sub-segment, contract strategy and risk management 
strategy in general. What is particularly interesting is that both companies have recently 
experienced financial distress, suggesting that implementing an active hedging strategy in 
order to avoid financial distress may prove insufficient as long as a global financial crisis 
negatively affects all industries. 
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1. General Notes 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Shipping is a traditional industry with traces all the way back to the ‘Westline’ that started in 
Lebanon 3000 BC. The industry is truly international with around 100 trading countries and 
carries around 90 per cent of the global trade.  During the last century, the industry has 
experienced remarkable development; the fleet has grown both in terms of number of ships 
and carrying capacity. The larger vessels have led to the construction of larger ports with 
more efficient handling gear, and the ability to take advantage of economies of scale. The 
size of the fleet has grown in accordance with the increasing growth of world trade, which is 
the main driver behind sea transport. The main characteristics of the industry have not 
changed much though; the industry is still embodied with volatility, cyclicality, seasonality 
and uncertainty in general concerning both income and expenses due to fluctuating price 
levels. 
Through the operation of its vessels the shipowning company is exposed to several risks. The 
freight rates which constitute the main revenue are fluctuating and unpredictable, and so 
are operating costs in terms of bunker fuel. Bad weather may cause loss of the vessel and 
accidents may cause damages and unforeseen docking of the vessel and port congestion 
may cause delays, all of which will affect the owners’ cash flows. Because of its capital 
intensiveness, a change in interest rate levels may cause severe changes in debt payments. 
In addition, because it is such an international industry, the participants are also subject to 
fluctuating exchange rates. And finally, the risk of the counterparty being unable to fulfil its 
agreements and pay when due is also crucial and has gained increasing attention due to the 
current financial turmoil. All these factors combined, make risk management very important 
for shipowners in achieving predictability and reduce cash flow fluctuations.  
Over the years shipping participants have seen the rise and fall of the freight futures 
contract, and the introduction of Over the Counter (OTC) Forward contracts, options and 
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swaps. These contracts have made operational risk management cheaper, more flexible and 
readily available to parties exposed to adverse movements especially in the freight market.   
 
1.2 Objective 
 
As the shipping industry is risky and embodied with volatility, cyclicality, seasonality and 
uncertainty in general, this thesis will focus on how shipowners in fact can manage their risk 
exposures and make cash flows more predictable. The thesis will thus investigate risk 
exposure and determine which instruments are available for hedging risk. After the available 
hedging strategies are emphasised, the two dry bulk shipping companies Golden Ocean 
Group Ltd and Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA will be used as case studies. The main objectives are 
to see what risk management instruments are actually being employed in practice and to 
take a look at how the current global financial crisis have affected the shipping industry and 
its companies. 
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1.3 Outline 
 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter two contains a presentation of the shipping industry and its economics with the 
purpose of laying the foundation for the importance of risk management. 
In chapter three, the current financial crisis and its repercussions on the dry bulk industry 
has been outlined. The focus of the chapter is the dry bulk crisis and why it happened as well 
as its consequences.   
Chapter four includes an introduction to Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance theorem. In 
addition, it explains capital structure, hedging and financial distress and how these influence 
the risk exposure. 
 Chapter five includes risk management in shipping and starts with an explanation of why 
risk management is of such vital importance in the shipping industry. The chapter introduces 
the different risks and how these risks are commonly managed through a variety of hedging 
instruments.  
In chapter six, a case study has been used in order to take a look at which instruments are 
being employed in practice. Two dry bulk shipping companies Golden Ocean Group Limited 
and Camillo Eitzen &Co ASA have been used as cases and have thus been analysed in order 
to state an example of how risk management works in the real world. 
In chapter seven, the thesis is summarised and conclusions are drawn. 
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2. Economics of Shipping 
 
Shipping is a captivating business. As one of the world’s most international and capital 
intensive industries, shipping has since the very beginning been characterised by creativity, 
skills, cyclicality, remarkable profits and some devastating miscalculations. 
Shipping, trade and economic development are closely linked together in the sense that 
trade promotes shipping, and shipping offers the transport needed to encourage economic 
development.  Shipping is moreover an industry in constant change that has grown up with 
the world economy and is today a worldwide business community, built on transportation 
and free trade.  
Ultimately, shipping consists of a group of people who work closely together on the mission 
of transporting cargo by sea. The participants are shipowners, charterers, brokers, 
shipbuilders and scrappers, financial institutions, insurance- and classification agencies, 
publishers, legal advisors and regulators. These players all interact in order to make the 
industry prosperous and more efficient.  
The importance of sea transport is reflected in the size of the fleet, the volume of cargo 
transported, and the annual revenue. The industry carries, according to the International 
Maritime Organisation (2006), over 90 per cent of global trade. As of 1 January 2008 the 
world fleet consisting of 50,525 vessels with a combined tonnage of over 728 million gross 
tonnes transported over 7.7 billion tonnes of cargo.  The 2006 revenue generated by 
operating the merchant fleet represented about 5 per cent of the global economy, 
approaching USD 500 billion in freight rates (Shipping Facts, 2009). 
The commodities shipped by sea are commonly arranged into four groups; Energy Trades 
dominates the bulk shipping and accounts for 44 per cent of seaborne trade;  Metal Industry 
Trades accounts for 18 per cent of total sea transportation; a total of seven commodities 
comprises the Agricultural and Forestry Trades accounts for 9 per cent; and finally, Other 
Cargoes accounts for 28 per cent of sea trade and consists mainly of high value, low volume 
commodities generally transported in specialised vessels and container ships (Stopford, 
2009).  
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The shipping industry and its markets are characterised by exceptionally low barriers to 
trade and fairly free information resulting in almost free and perfect competition. All that is 
needed to enter the industry is a ship and a crew, both easily accessible in the liquid second-
hand market and in low cost countries respectively. As long as the freight rates are high, 
funds for financing a vessel is easily obtained through different financial institutions and 
private investors. Correspondingly, due to the liquid second-hand market, exit barriers 
hardly exist. There may, however, exist a value gain or loss in the sense that second-hand 
prices fluctuate significantly along with freight rates. 
 
2.1 Bulk Shipping 
 
Bulk shipping goes all the way back to the 19th century and the coal trade between North 
England and London. Since then, the volume of seaborne trade has grown tremendously and 
there has been a consequent increase in the use of bulk shipping in order to exploit 
economies of scale and improved handling efficiency. Many different ship types are used for 
bulk transport, and the bulk fleet today consists mainly of tankers, dry bulk carriers, 
combined carriers, and various specialist vessels (Stopford, 2009). 
Stopford (1997, p. 293) defines bulk cargo in two different ways, the first as “any cargo that 
is transported by sea in large consignments in order to reduce unit cost”, the second 
definition states that bulk is “anything whose physical characteristics allow it to be handled 
in bulk”. Both definitions reflect the main principle of bulk transport, notably the principle of 
‘One ship, one cargo’ where the ultimate objective is to reduce costs.  
When bulk vessels are carrying bulk commodities the cargo is referred to as ‘bulk cargo’, 
except when the cargo is transported by using the liner service, the cargo then turns into 
‘general cargo’. Bulk cargo is divided into three main groups. The first group is liquid bulks 
consisting of crude oil, oil products, LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas), LNG (Liquefied Natural 
Gas), and chemicals. The second group is the five major bulks comprising iron ore, coal, 
grain, bauxite and alumina, and phosphate rock. Finally, the minor bulks cover steel 
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products, forest products, cement, fertilizers, manganese, sugar, soya meal, scrap, coke, pig 
iron, and rice (Stopford, 2009). 
Four principles determine whether a load of cargo should be transported in a bulk carrier or 
by using the liner service, the first is the volume of the cargo; the second is its physical 
handling and stowage characteristics, followed by the value of the cargo, and finally the 
regularity of the material flow. If the commodity has high volume and low value it will 
probably be transported in a bulk vessel, hence crude oil and the five major bulks are almost 
entirely shipped in bulk vessels. Low volume cargo with irregular shipment and handling and 
stowage difficulties will most likely be shipped in a container vessel.  
2.1.1 The Dry Bulk Market 
The dry bulk shipping market is providing sea transport for the five major bulks and the 
minor bulks in different types of ships. The vessels are normally categorised into four 
segments depending on the volume and type of cargo transported.  
Table 2.1 Dry bulk market segmentation by vessel size 
Vessel type # of vessels Vessel size Cargo type 
Capesize 821 100,000+ dwt Iron ore, coal 
Panamax 1550 60,000 - 100,000 dwt Coal, grain, bauxite and larger 
minor bulk cargo 
Handymax/Supramax 1719 40,000 - 60,000 dwt Minor bulks and smaller parcels 
of major bulks such as grain, 
bauxite and coal 
Handysize 2869 10,000 - 40,000 dwt Carries the same cargo as 
Handymax/Supramax 
                     Sources: Clarkson RSL (2009); Kavussanos (2002) 
 
It needs to be noted that the segmentation of the dry bulk fleet tend to vary slightly across 
different sources. 
The total bulk carrier fleet currently (March 2009) consists of 6959 vessels constituting a 
total of 417.5 million dwt (Clarkson Research Services Ltd, 2009) According to Platou (2008) 
the dry bulk market represents approximately 40 per cent of aggregate volume transported 
by sea. Iron ore, coal and grain are the largest of the major bulk trades, and because of their 
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volume transported, these three are the driving force behind the dry bulk carrier market 
(Stopford, 2009). Hence the whole dry bulk market is subject to changes in the patterns of 
these commodities, which all has its own unique industrial characteristics and growth trends 
and thus impact on the dry bulk shipping industry. 
 
2.2 Shipping Demand and Supply 
 
In order to understand what is going on in the diverse shipping markets, it is vital to take a 
look at what causes the freight market cycles. This is done by using the supply and demand 
market model. The model has two main components, supply and demand, linked by freight 
rates which help bring supply and demand into balance in order to achieve an equilibrium 
price. Freight cycles are generally irregular as the demand for ships changes rapidly whereas 
the supply is slow and heavy because of the time-lag from the ordering of ships until 
delivery.  
2.2.1 Demand for Sea Transport 
There are numerous factors influencing the shipping market; and Stopford (2009) has 
identified five particularly important variables affecting shipping demand. The first and most 
vital is the world economy, the reason why this is such an important variable is that it is the 
world economy that drives shipping, with no world trade there would be no need for sea 
transport. The second variable is the structure of commodity trades, where short- and long-
term trends play a vital part and can lead to alterations in ship demand. A third variable is 
the distance, also referred to as average haul. Political events are the fourth demand 
variable where random shocks such as weather changes, wars, new resources, or commodity 
price changes may affect the stability of the economic system. The final demand variable is 
transport costs, which is important for long-term demand. 
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2.2.2 Supply of Sea Transport 
Stopford (2009) also indentified five variables influencing the supply of sea transport. The 
first variable is the merchant fleet and its expansion and contraction. Fleet productivity is 
also vital for the supply side of shipping and is therefore the second variable. The third 
supply variable is the long-cycle process of shipbuilding production, followed by the number 
of vessels lost at sea and sold for scrapping. The last variable influencing supply of sea 
transport is the freight rates, which is also the ultimate regulator motivating the decision-
makers to adjust capacity, improve their service, and reduce costs.  
According to Stopford (2009) there are four groups of decision-makers influencing the supply 
of ships, notably shipowners, charterers, the banks that finance shipping, and regulatory 
authorities. Of these decision-makers, the shipowners are the primary ones, making 
decisions on when to order new ships, when to sell old vessels for demolition, and when to 
lay up tonnage.  
Table 2.2 The ten demand and supply variables 
Demand Supply 
1. The world economy 
2. Seaborne commodity trades 
3. Average haul 
4. Random shocks 
5. Transport costs 
1. World fleet 
2. Fleet productivity 
3. Shipbuilding production 
4. Scrapping and losses 
5. Freight revenue 
                           Source: Stopford (2009, p. 136) 
2.2.3 The Freight Rate Mechanism 
The freight market is the adjustment mechanism linking supply and demand. It operates 
through the freight rate negotiations of shipowners and charterers. This rate reflects the 
balance of ships and cargoes available in the market. Hence if there is excess supply, rates 
are low, and if the demand exceeds the supply, the rates will soar.  
The supply function for one single vessel is a J-shaped curve illuminating the amount of 
transport the owner makes available at each level of freight rates. In a weak market when 
the rates are low, the supply curve is almost flat. The least efficient vessels are laid up, and 
the speed of the operating fleet is slow. As soon as the freight rates are starting to rise, more 
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vessels are added to the active fleet and the vessels are speeding up. When the market 
finally is in tight equilibrium and rates are high, there will be no laid up tonnage and the fleet 
will operate at full speed.  
The demand function shows how charterers respond to changes in freight rates. The 
demand curve is almost vertical due to the lack of a competing form of transport which can 
move large volumes of cargo at the same relatively low rates; the cargo needs to be shipped 
regardless of price. Moreover, the low value of freight cost compared to the final price of the 
goods transported is also contributing to the demand function being nearly inelastic.  
The intersection between the supply and demand curves indicates the equilibrium price; this 
price specifies a mutually acceptable price. Both the demand and the supply function are 
illustrated in figure 2.1 which is based on Stopford’s figure 4.12 (2009). 
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Figure 2.1 Shipping supply and demand functions 
 
         Source: Stopford (2009, p. 161) 
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2.3 The Four Shipping Markets 
 
Stopford (2009) divides the shipping industry into four core markets, each trading in a 
different commodity. The freight market trades in sea transport, the sale and purchase 
market trades second-hand ships, the newbuilding market deals in new ships, and the 
demolition market trades scrap ships.  
2.3.1 The Freight Market 
The participants of the freight market are shipowners who sell sea transport, charterers who 
buy the freight, and ship brokers who put the deal together.  
The most frequently used contracts are the voyage charter, the contract of affreightment, 
time charter and the bare boat charter, all of which are thoroughly explained in section 
5.2.1. When the deal is fixed the parties sign the charter-party which is the written contract 
stating the terms and conditions and anticipating the problems that may possibly arise. The 
freight rates are determined by demand and supply, which in turn is influenced by several 
variables, see section 2.3. 
2.3.2 The Sale and Purchase Market 
The sale and purchase market is where the shipowners meet to buy and sell existing ships, 
assisted by a broker. This market and its liquidity is the reason why barriers to trade in the 
shipping industry are so limited. The price volatility of the sale and purchase market leaves 
room for “Asset Play”, meaning that a vessel is bought cheap and sold for an escalated price, 
which is an important source of income for shipping investors.  
Second-hand ship prices are generally determined by supply and demand, but are also 
affected by four main factors; freight rates, the age of the ship, inflation, and market 
expectations. The reason why second-hand prices and freight rates are closely linked is that 
when freight rates are high, estimated future earnings of the vessel is high, and when the 
rates are low, future earnings will be low.  
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2.3.3 The Newbuilding Market 
The participants of the newbuilding market are shipowners or shipping investors ordering a 
new vessel and the ship yards that will build the ship, the deal is also here negotiated 
through a broker. The market is quite long term as it normally takes 2-3 years from the ship 
is ordered until delivery, expectations and predictions are therefore very important. 
Shipbuilding prices are determined by supply and demand where the demand is influenced 
by freight rates, second-hand prices, liquidity of the buyers, credit availability, and 
expectations. The key issues affecting the supply side on the other hand, are production 
costs, number of available berths, and the size of the order book.  
2.3.4 The Demolition Market 
The fourth market is the demolition market where old ships are being scrapped and the 
scrap steel is being sold to the steel construction industry. The customers in this market are 
the scrap yards buying ships from the owners, generally handled by a broker. Today most of 
the scrap yards are located on a beach in the Far East (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
China) where labour costs are low. Prices can be very volatile, varying from ship to ship, and 
are settled through negotiation depending on the availability of ships for scrapping and the 
demand for scrap metal.  
2.3.5 The Link between the Four Shipping Markets 
As the same participants are essentially involved in all the markets, their activities are closely 
interrelated. Stopford (2009) explains how waves of cash flowing between the four markets 
are the phenomenon linking them together, this is illustrated in figure 2.2  
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Figure 2.2 The four shipping markets and how they correlate 
 
These waves of cash flowing between the four shipping markets are what ultimately drive 
the shipping market cycle. All the markets will affect the others in a certain way. For instance 
if supply and demand for freight are in tight balance, and if demand is increased the rates 
will rise and second-hand prices and the size of the order books will increase. A few years 
later when the new ships are delivered there may be a situation of excess supply and the 
whole process goes into reverse with falling rates squeezing cash flows as the money goes 
out of the market to pay for the newbuildings. Financially weak owners who cannot meet 
their obligations are forced to sell in the second-hand market, resulting in reduced prices in 
this market; if the ships are too old they may have to be sold for demolition instead. As more 
ships are scrapped, supply of freight falls and the rates are bid back up and the entire 
process starts again.  
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2.4 Freight Rate Volatility 
 
Freight rates of sea transport are extremely volatile and make up the greatest risk of the 
shipping business as the freight income is the primary revenue for shipowners. A stable and 
predictable income is what all shipowners desire, hence the severe volatility of freight rates 
have been a major concern since the very beginning.  The rates are generally determined by 
demand and supply, but in addition to the variables outlined in table 2.2 there are a few 
other factors affecting the volatility of freight rates.  
The Baltic Exchange (2009) has found that freight rates fluctuate because the freight market 
is subject to a variety of external variables, but there are six fundamental factors driving the 
freight rates. The first factor is fleet supply which relates to the number of available ships, 
new deliveries and ships sold for scrapping. The second is commodity demand which is 
affected by industrial production, the levels of imports, and the performance of different 
industries. The third factor is seasonal pressures on which the weather has a large impact in 
terms of the size of the harvests and for instance the amount of ice in ports. Bunker prices is 
the fourth factor resulting in fluctuating freight rates, since bunker fuel account for 
approximately 25-35 per cent of voyage costs, oil price movements will consequently affect 
shipowners directly unless they trade in the time charter market. 
The fifth factor, choke points, includes narrow canals such as the Panama and the Suez 
canals causing congestions. The last factor identified by the Baltic Exchange is market 
sentiment because market opinions affect the freight markets just as much as actual demand 
and supply. 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates how the prices for dry freight have fluctuated from January 2000 
until February 2009.  
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Figure 2.3 The development of the Baltic Dry Index during the last eight years 
 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) suggest that under a tight freight market when rates are 
high, changes in demand produce large variations in freight rates. This means that volatility 
and freight risks are higher in a tight and strong market. And conversely, rates are less 
volatile and freight risks are lower under weak market conditions.  
 
2.5 Market Cycles 
 
Market cyclicality is a well known phenomenon in various industries worldwide, and in the 
shipping industry they play a large role since as long as there are fluctuations in supply and 
demand, cycles will occur. Shipping cycles are irregular with no firm rules about the length or 
timing, consequently the cycles are unique and hard to predict.  
Stopford (2009) makes a distinction between the long-term trend and the short-term cycle, 
by doing this it is possible to identify three types of cycles.  
The long-term cycle is influenced by developments in the world economy and the level of 
shipbuilding capacity, which ultimately affect the growth rate of seaborne trade.  
The short-term cycle fluctuates and may last for 3 to 12 years from peak to peak. The 
function of the short shipping market cycle is to coordinate supply and demand and is mainly 
driven by economic business cycles. Stopford (2009) identifies four distinct stages in the 
short cycle. The first stage is a market trough featured by surplus shipping capacity and 
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falling rates, the next stage is recovery where supply and demand move towards balance and 
rates are slowly rising, stage 3 is the peak where freight rates are high and demand and 
supply are in tight balance, finally there is the collapse when supply exceeds demand and 
rates are once again falling. 
Lastly, freight rates fluctuating within a year is rather common and is referred to as seasonal 
cycles. This is particularly an issue for the dry bulk agricultural trades when rates are differing 
depending on the timing of the harvests.  
Although the shipping market cycles are irregular and hard to predict they have a purpose. 
The cycles create an environment in which financially weak shipping companies are forced to 
bankruptcy in troughs, leaving the strong to survive and prosper. This will eventually 
produce a lean and efficient shipping business.  
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3. The Dry Bulk Collapse 
 
2007 was a really good year for dry bulk shipping with high rates, full utilization of the fleet, 
and correspondingly high profits for the shipowners. Rates doubled from the previous year 
and rose from January to November, followed by a moderate decline in December. The dry 
bulk fleet reported a growth rate of 7 per cent, increased sailing distances, more port 
congestion, longer waiting time for repair and maintenance and a long order book at the 
shipyards. This trend resulted in a 13 per cent increase in demand for sea transport. As a 
response, a total of 162 million of new tonnage was ordered, which is more than three times 
the orders of 2006 (Platou, 2008). 
The Baltic Dry Index reported in 2008 a record high of 11,793 points implying record high 
rates as the index is an indicator for the dry bulk shipping freight rates. The Baltic Dry Index 
has existed since 1998 and is managed by the Baltic Exchange, which is further explained in 
section 5.2.3.1.  
Since the peak 20 May 2008, the rates have reached rock bottom. During the peak weighted 
average earnings for bulk carriers reached USD 68,848 a day (Clarkson Research Services Ltd, 
2008) followed by a collapse in which freight rates for all segments dropped to only USD 4-
5000 a day. By October 2008 at least four dry-bulk shipping companies, including Armada 
(Singapore) Pte and Britannia Bulk Holdings Plc, sought protection from creditors worldwide 
and have later gone bankrupt. China’s planned crisis stimulus of USD 585 billion also failed to 
encourage demand in the world’s biggest market for dry bulk ships (Leung, 2009). 
 
3.1 Why Did the Rates Fall? 
 
The Baltic Dry Index fell over 90 per cent last year, from 11,793 point to 663 points reported 
5 December 2008 (The Baltic Exchange). One reason for this is that demand for raw 
materials plunged as Europe, Japan, and the United States simultaneously entered their first 
recessions since the Second World War (Nightingale, 2009). This recession was triggered by 
the financial turmoil in the US during the summer of 2007, which worsened in September 
18 
 
2008 and was spread to the rest of the world in just a few weeks.  But In order to explain 
why the rates plunged, one needs to consider the demand and supply variables outlined in 
2.2, which ultimately determines the freight rate level. 
The dry bulk fleet reported a growth of 6.5 per cent during 2008. This was mainly due to the 
24 million dwt of deliveries that year, whereas only 4.3 million dwt was deleted. In addition, 
5 million dwt of converted tankers entered the bulk market due to the record high rates. 
Utilization of the fleet was in 2007 and during the first half of 2008 at full capacity 
(Platou, 2009). 
The world economy has had a strong growth the last five years with an average growth of 5 
per cent annually. At the same time the tonnage demand has increased surprisingly 8 per 
cent. 2008 on the other hand, despite the flying start, only ended up with a tonnage demand 
growth of 4 per cent. 
Basically what caused the dramatic fall in freight rates and ultimately resulting in a collapse 
for the dry bulk industry was that supply of sea transport exceeded demand for the same 
transport. The sudden deterioration in economic activity towards the end of 2008 resulted in 
a sharp drop in the need for sea transport and explains the collapse in freight rates. The 
supply for sea transport increased rapidly due to extensive new orders encouraged by the 
record high rates, and at the same time the tonnage removed from the market was only 
minor.  
In order to restore the balance between demand and supply in the dry bulk industry, the 
fleet needs to be reduced and the demand needs to increase. The industry cannot influence 
demand but it has some control over supply in terms of the level of newbuildings and vessels 
sold for scrapping. The shipowners are thus the main decision makers who can affect the 
supply by reducing the number of ships in the fleet by cancelling new orders and by selling 
more vessels for scrapping. 
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3.2 Consequences of the Crisis 
 
Dry bulk shipowners have seen their profits diminish and share values plunge along with the 
falling freight rates when the market collapsed. When the rates slumped as a result of a 20 
to 30 per cent cut in steel output reducing demand for transportation of iron ore, and after a 
freeze on credit made it harder to fund cargoes, things started to go wrong. Several vessels 
became idle and were waiting for employment as the need for transportation weakened. 
The Danish company Atlas Shipping A/S for instance, had to file for bankruptcy as it faced 
losses of USD 3 million a day due to the present freight rates and the charter parties they 
entered before the crisis (Shipping Times, 2008).  
The fall of the rates can be exemplified by looking at the Capesize segment. During 2008 
Capesize spot rates varied between USD 234,000 per day at the peak and USD 2,300 per day 
at the lowest. For one year time charter, however, the rates from peak to bottom are not as 
extreme, ranging from USD 170,000 to USD 18,000 (DNV, 2009). When looking at these 
deteriorating freight rate levels it is not hard to understand that vessel values also had to be 
affected as expected future earnings also was drastically reduced. By the 4th quarter 2008, 
market values for five year old Capesize and Panamax vessels had dropped approximately 60 
per cent. Values dropped from USD 155 million to USD 49 million, and USD 90 million to USD 
30 million respectively only in five months (Platou, 2009). Since the vessel values for virtually 
all the segments more than halved in 2008, several shipowners are now breaching covenants 
and face the threat of financial distress and eventually bankruptcy. 
The credit crunch has made banks become reluctant or actually even unable to grant loans, 
and as a consequence only half of all the newbuildings in the dry bulk industry are fully 
financed. This will eventually lead to cancellations of new orders, which in turn will have 
consequences for the yards facing the threat of bankruptcy. However, it turns out that the 
yards have been too optimistic and have accepted more orders than they can possibly 
deliver when due, and this has opened up for owners being able to cancel the vessels as the 
yards have already broken the terms of the contract (Bjørndal, 2009).  Ultimately, these 
cancellations will help to ease the pressure of continued overcapacity.  
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Several high profile shipping companies has been hit by counterparties not being able to pay 
the full rate or only being able to give parts of the payment of charter hires agreed upon in 
the charterparty. Other companies has experienced early redelivery of vessels on long term 
time charter or cancelled contracts of affreightment. Hence, another consequence is that 
many time charters fixed before the market collapse have been cancelled or renegotiated 
and resettled at much lower rate levels.  
Scrapping volumes are surging every week, and several shipowning companies are now 
trying to cancel or delay future deliveries. The cancellation of vessels has its cost, however, 
because the yards have to be compensated, but still, this is cheaper than taking delivery of a 
new vessel that will only become idle. Platou (2009) reports that numbers of ships sold for 
scrapping has actually increased, with only 3 vessels sold in 2007, the numbers from 2008 
increased to 36 vessels. So far in 2009, 39 vessels have been scrapped, and at the same time 
only 16 vessels were delivered, and thus there are signs of fleet contraction. However, there 
are still 3,387 vessels distributed among the four segments to be delivered within the next 
few years (Clarkson Research Services Ltd, 2009). 
Figure 3.1 shows how the freight rates plunged, how the steel production has declined, how 
the demand dropped, and how market values for the diverse bulk sub-sectors have slumped 
during the second half of 2008.   
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Figure 3.1 The consequences of the global financial crisis 
 
 
To sum up, the consequences of the global financial crisis is that commodity demand has 
been reduced, which in turn has reduced demand for sea transport and freight rates have 
plunged. Lower freight rates have resulted in reduced earnings to shipowners. The 
overcapacity has led to tonnage being laid up or idle, and owners have experienced further 
reduced revenue. The reduced rates have also eventually resulted in reduced vessel value as 
estimated future earnings of the vessels are reduced. This has led to heavy write-downs, 
covenants violations and default on bank loans because the vessels are generally used as 
collateral for bank loans. Moreover, as counterparties are getting into financial distress and 
are unable to make payments when due, the situation only gets worse and has major effects 
on shipowners. In the second-hand market, shipowners exit purchase deals and as a 
consequence they have to pay penalty clauses. In addition, the companies face reduced 
liquidity because of the reduced revenue which ultimately affects the shareholders. 
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3.3 Was the Crisis Inevitable? 
  
After a five year peak in the dry bulk industry driven by the record high world GNP growth 
and the increasing Chinese trade, which together put even more pressure on an already tight 
market, a market collapse was expected. Especially given that over the last 40 years, the 
growth in the world economy has been interrupted by major recessions every 7-8 years. 
There is as mentioned in chapter 2. a direct link between the world economy and the 
shipping industry, hence when the world economy slows down, so does seaborne trade. The 
current economic slump is driven by the credit crisis and ‘bubbles’ in certain industries, 
principally steel and real estate. The collapse in these two markets combined caused severe 
repercussions on the dry bulk industry because they were the main drivers behind the dry 
bulk shipping boom, particularly the Chinese steel production. In early 2008 when the 
demand for real estate declined combined with increased construction, the prices stopped 
rising and buyers pulled out, ultimately causing a market decline and consequently the 
demand for iron ore and steel was reduced as well (Stopford, 2008). Hence, historically and 
according to normal business cycle theory, after a boom there will always be a collapse 
because the tight market in equilibrium cannot go on forever. Normally the collapse in 
shipping occurs when supply overtakes demand and freight rates starts falling, all as a 
consequence of the business cycle downturn, see section 2.5. 
As early as 4 February 2008, RS Platou predicted that the dry bulk rates had already reached 
the all time high, and that they would subsequently fall during the next two years due to the 
fleet growth (DN, 2008). They were wrong in the sense that the peak was already reached, 
as this did not happen until May the same year. However, they were right concerning the 
fleet expansion, but they could hardly have predicted the fall in world commodity demand.  
All in all it seems that most analytics and market agents could see the bubble burst and that 
a collapse was inevitable, but no one knew the timing, the length, the depth and the severity 
of the crisis. Still it is impossible to know the total outcome of this downward spiral.  
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3.4 The Rise of the Rates 
 
After the dip in December 2008 the rates have risen slowly. During January the rates 
continued to fluctuate at a low level. February, however, was a better month for the dry bulk 
market where the level finally passed 1,000 points. As a consequence of the rising freight 
rates the chances of more companies going bankrupt were now limited and the value of 
their shares were increasing as well.  
One of the reasons why the rates finally started to rise is that the Chinese steelmakers again 
started to buy iron ore from Brazil and Australia creating a demand for sea transport on 
these distances, and China’s crisis stimulus finally started to pay off (Byberg, 2009). The 
upswing was thus driven by speculative traders taking advantage of the low freight rates and 
cheap iron ore, as well as a bet on the Chinese crisis package. 
Figure 3.2 The rise of the rates from dip until mid February 2009 
 
Figure 3.3 The rise of the rates in a larger context 
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The most critical issue at the moment is the massive delivery of new vessels that are due 
from the present and until 2013. The orderbook today (March 2009) consist of 47 per cent of 
the consisting fleet Platou, 2009), and since there is already an overcapacity situation in 
addition to the reduced demand, a larger fleet will just worsen the situation and postpone 
the recovery of the currently low market. The main problems with the massive delivery 
schedule are whether there will be finance available to fund these vessels and whether the 
yards are actually able to deliver all the ships contracted. According to Platou’s calculations, 
a minimum of 35 to 40 per cent of the bulk newbuildings need to be deleted from the order 
book and some 20 per cent needs to be delayed in order to avoid a structural overcapacity in 
the future (Platou, 2009). Even though the volume of tonnage sold for scrapping and the 
numbers of cancellation have increased, the fleet size will still increase considerably.  
What is important right now is that the rates are slowly rising and by April 2009 at least the 
rates covered the break-even for five year old vessels illustrated in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 The present dry bulk market (April 2009) 
 Spot 1 year T/C Break-even for a 5 year old ship 
Capesize USD 28,400 USD 28,500 USD 20,900 
Panamax USD 16,800 USD 15,500 USD 14,400 
Supramax USD 17,300 USD 13,000 USD 12,900 
                    Source: DNV (2009) 
From mid April to Mid May the Baltic Exchange reported that the Index was up 73 per cent 
ending up at 2,544 points. Since then the rates have continued to rise and 28 May the Index 
landed at 3,298 points. Hence, the rates from April in figure 3.1 have probably increased as 
well. 
Although there are some positive factors such as limited yard subsidises and increasing 
numbers of tonnage demolished, there are according to DNV (2009) three significant 
challenges shipowners currently face. These are loss of revenue due to low rates and 
reduced activity, lack of financing and a too high cost structure as bunker prices have started 
to rise.  
The current situation is being compared to the situation in the tanker industry in the 1970s 
when things developed badly and from which it took over 17 years to clear up the aftermath. 
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However, it is still uncertain how long, deep and severe this current downturn will be; one 
just has to wait and see. 
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4. Risk Management – A Miller & Modigliani Analysis 
 
A central point in finance is that risk is undesirable, and a risk averse company would want to 
eliminate or at least manage its risks. Risk exposure may be affected by the capital structure 
and the hedging strategy of the firm. The two economists Modigliani and Miller (MM) have 
developed an irrelevance theorem that can be applied to both capital structure and hedging.  
 
4.1 The Irrelevance of Capital Structure 
 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) are famous for their propositions developed in the late 1950s. 
Their irrelevance theorem states that the value of the company will not be affected by its 
capital structure. The theorem is, however, based on the assumptions that the sum of all 
future cash flows distributed to the firm’s debt and equity holders is unaffected by the 
capital structure; there exist no personal or corporate taxes; no transaction costs; and no 
arbitrage opportunities are available in the economy (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). In addition, 
the possibility of bankruptcy and financial distress costs are being ignored. 
Another interpretation of MM’s theorem is that, in the absence of the market frictions 
mentioned above, shareholders are indifferent to a change in the firm’s capital structure. 
Modigliani and Miller argue that “what the firm can do, so can the investor” (Buckley, 2004, 
p .183). MM thus suggest that a shareholder can obtain homemade leverage, and by 
borrowing on his own account he can offset high or low corporate gearing by homemade 
leverage. 
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4.2 The Relevance of Capital Structure 
 
In the real world where market frictions do exist, the irrelevance of capital structure 
becomes more relevant. This can be explained by introducing dividend policy, taxes and 
costs of financial distress. 
4.2.1 Dividend 
The irrelevancy theorem can also be applied to dividends. MM argue that in a perfect capital 
market, with no transaction costs and no taxes, the dividend policy of the firm is irrelevant 
for the shareholders. They argue this the same way as for homemade leverage; that a 
shareholder can offset dividend by adjusting his own portfolio. In other words, if a 
shareholder receives more dividend than desired, he can just reinvest the excess amount. 
On the contrary, if he receives less than wanted, he can just sell shares and thus receive the 
amount of money desired.  
But as soon as the unrealistic assumptions are being altered, it seems that, depending on its 
investment opportunities, the firm should avoid dividend payouts as the shareholders will 
have to pay tax for these payments, and rather reinvest the earnings. A company with a high 
cash flow and few positive NPV opportunities will be paying dividend. In addition, the stock 
market reacts positively to increases in dividends and negatively to decreases (Ross, et al. 
2006). What is more is that the lower debt-to-equity ratio, the more earnings are available 
for shareholder dividends. This further suggests that the dividend policy actually matters 
after all.   
4.2.2 Taxes  
In a world without taxes the capital structure is irrelevant for the shareholders because high 
or low corporate gearing can be offset by homemade leverage. In the real world, however, 
this is not true as interest on debt is tax deductible. Because of this, the after-tax cash flows 
of a levered firm are larger than those of an all equity firm, which in turn leads firms to 
favour debt over equity financing.  
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The shipping industry is renowned for registering vessels in a particular country in order to 
reduce costs. Flags of convenience offer shipowners an alternative to being registered under 
their national flag. The advantages obtained from these open registries are associated with 
taxes, maritime safety conventions, crewing and terms of employment, and naval protection 
and political acceptability (Stopford, 2009). Taxes are therefore generally not an issue in the 
shipping industry. 
4.2.3 Financial Distress 
Distress or bankruptcy costs include expenses arising from conflicts between debt holders 
and equity holders and those arising from the firm’s stakeholders such as customers and 
suppliers being reluctant to do business with a company with financial difficulties.  
Financial distress occurs when a firm does not have sufficient cash flow to meet its 
obligations to pay when due and thus needs to take counteractive actions. Ross, et al. (2006) 
identifies several financial distress examples; these include dividend reductions, losses, plant 
closings, layoffs, falling stock prices and CEO resignation. In addition they identify numerous 
ways to deal with financial distress. The first three actions concern the firm’s assets and 
include selling major assets, merging with another firm or cutting costs. The next four 
actions are related to financial restructuring and consist of issuing new securities, 
negotiating with banks and creditors, exchange debt for equity or, finally, filing for 
bankruptcy.  
Bankruptcy costs are generally divided into two types of costs; direct and indirect costs. The 
former include administrative costs, accounting fees and legal expenses, whereas the latter 
consist of different losses such as loss of market share due to customers and other firms 
being unwilling to do business with a company in financial distress. Surveys show that 
together direct and indirect costs make up between 10 and 20 per cent of total firm value 
(Ross, et al., 2006). Other surveys show that the net present value of distress is normally 4-5 
per cent of the firm’s pre-distress value (Almeida & Philippon, 2007), and Korteweg (2007) 
found that the market usually expects costs of financial distress of 5 per cent of the firm’s 
value, and in addition the costs may vary between 0 and 16 per cent across different 
industries.  
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Bankruptcy costs, particularly the direct costs, are borne by the firm’s debt holders because 
if the firm files for bankruptcy, most of the firm’s values are transferred to the debt holders 
which are the first priority claimants. Since the lenders bear the costs of bankruptcy they will 
in addition to the interest payments require a default premium reflecting the probability of 
bankruptcy. This premium may therefore offset the advantages of debt financing if the 
probability of bankruptcy is large. It is consequently the shareholders who indirectly bear the 
expected costs of bankruptcy as they have to pay the extra premium, and when choosing the 
firm’s capital structure they need to consider these costs.  
Since bankruptcy costs are associated with debt, a firm’s capital structure is similar to a 
trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
This in turn suggests that there is in fact an optimal amount of debt after all, and that 
financial distress costs tend to offset the advantages to debt (Ross, et al., 2006).  
The conflicts which are the source of financial distress can be eliminated if the firm is 
financed entirely by equity. Distress and bankruptcy costs are therefore nonexistent if debt 
is not included in the capital structure. By adjusting the firm’s capital structure, the firm can 
therefore manage its risk of facing bankruptcy in the future. Accordingly, when opening up 
for risky debt and bankruptcy costs and ignoring MM’s rather unrealistic assumptions, one 
can clearly see that the capital structure does matter.  
 
4.3 The (Ir)relevance of Hedging 
 
Hedging is a way of protecting the firm against changes in the market conditions. Ross, et al. 
(2006) explains that hedging is when a firm reduces its risk exposure with the use of 
derivatives instruments. 
There are generally two sources of risk. The first type is systematic risk which constitutes 
movements in currencies, interest rates, commodity prices, and other changes in the 
aggregate economy. These exposures are generally non-diversifiable, but can often be 
hedged by taking opposite positions in the financial derivatives market. The other risk is 
normally diversifiable and is referred to as firm-specific risk.  This risk cannot be explained by 
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market movements, but relates to the firm’s capital expenditure and operation decisions as 
well as its financial decisions. These exposures cannot be hedged through derivatives 
contracts, but some of them, such as the risk of accidents happening, can be managed by 
using insurance contracts (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002).  
Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance theorem is rather general and can also be applied to 
hedging. MM thus argue that if the company can hedge, so can the investors. Consequently, 
in the absence of market frictions, corporate hedging is irrelevant to shareholders as they 
can hedge on their own accounts either by adjusting their portfolio to mitigate firm-specific 
risk, or by using derivative contracts to directly modify the portfolio’s exposure to systematic 
risk. 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) argue that by hedging its risks, a firm can increase its value by 
reducing the probability of facing financial distress in the future. This suggests that through 
the absence of hedging, the chance of financial distress is increased. And subsequently, a 
firm that stays un-hedged might experience its debt holders demanding higher returns to 
compensate for higher expected bankruptcy costs and/or they might negotiate stricter debt 
covenants. This further implies that firms that are subject to high costs associated with 
financial distress will have greater incentives to implement hedges. 
In theory, individuals can hedge as effectively as large companies. Nevertheless, in reality 
large companies are often in better positions to hedge certain risks. This is because it is 
costly for individuals to learn how to hedge, and because the company itself has more 
knowledge on what exposures it faces and will need to hedge (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). 
Consequently, if individuals are not able to hedge as effectively as the company, then it will 
obviously be in the shareholders interest to let the firm manage these risks and perform 
corporate hedging. 
Subsequently, one could say that, in the real world where markets are imperfect; if the 
hedge reduces the probability of financial distress, the firm can gain from hedging. This is 
especially true for companies operating in industries where financial distress costs are high. 
Moreover, rather than the risk of bankruptcy itself, it is the costs related to bankruptcy that 
reduces firm value. Each of the costs related to financial distress is not significant, but the 
sum of these costs is rather substantial and may thus affect the capital structure of the firm. 
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This gives managers the right incentive to reduce these costs by hedging. This further 
suggests that in the real world, shareholders are not indifferent to corporate hedging. 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) have investigated which firms are most likely to trade in the 
derivatives market. The results show that larger firms as well as firms with more growth 
opportunities and firms with a high gearing ratio are more likely to use derivatives. In 
addition, they found that firms that are subject to high financial distress costs have greater 
incentives to hedge. And since it is actually rather common that 80 – 90 per cent of a vessel’s 
value is financed through debt (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a, p. 339), distress costs are high 
and shipowners should have the right incentive to implement hedges.  
As the fundamental aim of any company is to obtain stable and predictable values of its cash 
flows, debt and assets, virtually any risk can be managed in one way or another. Risks may 
be mitigated through capital structure adjustments, by using physical contracts or through 
exploiting the derivatives market; this is thoroughly explained in section 5.1. In the shipping 
industry the most common exposures to hedge through the derivatives market are freight 
rates, bunker prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Credit risk and liquidity risk can be 
hedged by implementing specific policies in terms of intentionally choosing counterparties 
or keeping a certain amount of assets in cash respectively. Other risks may be managed by 
insurance contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
5. Hedging in Shipping Using Derivatives 
 
In an industry characterised by irregular market cycles, freight rate volatility and uncertainty 
in general, risk management is extremely important. Grinblatt and Titman (2002, p. 739) 
defines risk management as “assessing and managing the company’s exposure to various 
sources of risk through the use of financial derivatives, insurance, and other activities”. 
Through their daily operations the shipowners are faced with a substantial business risk. 
Fluctuating freight rates and bunker prices affect the revenue. The value of the vessel also 
swings violently together with the freight rates, influencing both the ability to repay debt 
and the gain from a possible asset play. The former may also be affected by a change in the 
interest rates as shipping is one of the most capital intensive industries in the world. Bad 
weather and storms may cause accidents and damages or loss of the entire vessel, or 
changes in demand due to harvests gone badly. Being such an international industry, the 
participants are also subject to fluctuations in the exchange rates. Basically it all boils down 
to the fact that shipping is a high-risk industry. Consequently, finding ways to minimise these 
risks are vital in order to achieve predictable and stable cash flows and debt. Some of these 
risks vary according to what market segment the company operates in, a few may be easily 
managed, whereas others are more complicated and require costs and skills.  
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) classify the different risks faced by shipowners into eight 
different informal categories. The first category is business risk which is caused by 
fluctuations in earnings. Sources that affect the earnings are freight rates, voyage costs, 
operating costs and foreign exchange rates. The second category is liquidity risk, which 
refers to the inability of selling company assets at short notice in order to raise money 
quickly in order to meet its short term obligations. The inability to pay principal and interest 
to the bank is referred to as default risk and is the third category. Financial risk is the next 
risk category and depends on how the company’s assets are financed. The relationship 
between equity and debt is vital here because a high gearing ratio increases the company’s 
debt obligations. The fifth category, credit risk, refers to the possibility of a counterparty not 
being able to fulfil its contractual agreements. Market risk is yet another category and is 
influenced by stock price, and other fluctuating prices such as freight rates, interest rates, 
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and exchange rates. Political risk is subject to political decisions such as wars, political 
unrest, and canal closures. The last category of risk faced by shipowners is technical and 
physical risk, which refers to the risk of loss, breakdown or damage on the vessel. It should, 
however, be noted that some of these risks are overlapping, and some composite other 
risks. 
Risk management has become increasingly important over the years and large international 
companies having their own risk management divisions have become more and more 
common. The main drivers behind this tendency are the increased volatility of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and commodity prices, as well as the importance of large multinational 
companies. Risk management is according to Grinblatt and Titman (2002) motivated by a 
variety of sources such as taxes, financial distress costs, executive incentives and other 
important issues.  
There are several ways for a company to perform risk management in order to stabilise their 
income and expenses in order to secure predictability. A main distinction is made between 
the traditional and the modern types of risk management. The traditional type includes the 
use of physical contracts such as long term time charters. This traditional method is not very 
flexible and rather expensive in terms of changing segments and entering new contracts. As 
an alternative, modern risk management have been established through exploiting the 
financial derivatives market. However, both methods are subject to credit risk, except for 
some certain derivatives contracts where this risk is eliminated by a clearing house, outlined 
in section 5.1.1. 
 
5.1 The Derivatives Market 
 
Operational risk management is a big issue for shipowners in the sense that long term 
charters may be difficult to find in a declining market, and agreements may be abandoned if 
the conditions turn too much against either the owner or the charterer, which has 
particularly been an issue in the current market collapse. As a solution to this problem, 
exchange traded derivatives contracts have been introduced also in the shipping industry.  
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Derivatives instruments are contractually created rights and obligations whose purpose is to 
transfer risk to some other party willing to bear it (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). These 
contracts are referred to as derivatives because the price of the contract is derived from 
underlying assets such as physical commodities, financial instruments, indices, or spreads 
between the values of such assets. Derivatives are thus instruments that have no intrinsic 
value but derive their value from something else, and they help investors manage risk, 
particularly in markets where price volatility is high. By using derivatives, shipowners are 
able to stabilise their future inflow and they can thus reduce uncertainty and unexpected 
volatility of their cash flows.  
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) have identified three different groups of participants acting 
in the derivatives markets. The first group is the hedgers. The members of this group are 
primarily risk averse and their aim is to stabilise their income, costs or debt. The second 
group consists of the less risk averse speculators. These are profit seeking individuals and 
firms who take a bet on the price movements. Speculators are essential to the liquidity of 
the market in the sense that they provide capital and they are willing to take risk. Without 
the speculators, the values of the market would be more extreme and irregular as there 
would be no counterparties willing to take opposite positions. The last group of participants 
dealing in the derivatives market is the arbitrageurs, whose aim is to achieve a risk free 
profit. Their actions are based on different prices of the same good in different markets. 
Their profit comes from buying cheap and selling expensive. This price difference is caused 
by time-lags or temporary imbalances in supply and demand.  
Derivatives markets, and especially forwards and futures markets provides two main 
economic benefits. The first benefit is price discovery, meaning that the markets have the 
ability to reveal information about current and expected spot prices. The second benefit is 
that it provides risk management through hedging in order to reduce spot price risk 
(Kavussanos, 2002; Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006b). If the derivatives markets fail to provide 
these benefits, market agents have no interest or reason to trade and the market become 
illiquid and trade will eventually stop.  
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5.1.1 Futures 
When an asset is traded at immediate delivery a spot contract is entered. A futures contract, 
on the other hand, is a contract in which the buyer and the seller agrees on a price and 
quantity today, but delivery of the commodity occurs at a specified future date. A futures 
contract is standardised in terms of quantity, quality and duration, and it is traded only on 
organised exchanges. In addition, the futures are marked-to-market daily, meaning that the 
price of the instrument is re-valued daily in order to reflect current values of the relevant 
underlying variable. Counterparty risk for participants in the futures market is literally non-
existent as the futures exchange’s clearing house guarantees the transaction. This guarantee 
is the main task of a clearing house, and they do this by enforcing rules that lower 
counterparty risk by fulfilling a contract in the case of default (Bernrud, et al., 2005). 
5.1.2 Forwards 
A forward contract is rather similar to a futures contract except it is more flexible in the 
sense that it is traded Over the Counter (OTC) and not on organised exchanges. When a 
contract is traded OTC the counterparties negotiate terms and conditions of the contract 
and both parties agree to take the counterparty risk in case of default. A forward contract is 
thus not standardised in terms of size and expiry date, and details will be negotiated 
between the two parties at initiation.   
5.1.3 Options 
There are two basic types of option contracts. The buyer of a call option has the right but not 
the obligation to buy the underlying asset or security, whereas the buyer of a put option has 
the right but not the obligation to sell the underlying asset. An option contract is flexible in 
the sense that the buyer has the right to decide not to exercise the contract depending on 
whether the current situation or price is in his favour. Investors use option contracts to 
speculate on price moves, to hedge the value of other positions, to reduce transaction costs, 
to avoid tax exposure, and to avoid market restrictions that may prohibit other forms of 
trading (Bernrud, et al., 2005). Option trading is a zero-sum game in the sense that the gains 
of one party is at the expense of another.  
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There are two main types of options offered with the only difference being the settlement 
date. The European option gives its holder the right to exercise it only on the maturity date, 
whereas the American option gives its holder the opportunity to exercise the contract at any 
time from initiation until the settlement date.  
An option contract can be in the money (ITM), out of the money (OTM) or at the money 
(ATM) referring to the value of the contract. If the call option is ITM, the strike price, which is 
the agreed price in which to trade the currency, is below the spot rate. When the strike price 
and the spot rate are equal the option is at the money and when the strike price is above the 
spot rate the option is OTM and will not be exercised because it will then be cheaper to buy 
at the current spot rate. Hence a call option will only be exercised if the spot rate is higher 
than the strike price and the opposite is true for the put option. 
5.1.4 Swaps 
A swap contract involves the simultaneous buying and selling of a comparable underlying 
asset. There are many types of swaps, and they are used to hedge a variety of exposures 
such as interest rates, exchange rates, equity, and commodity prices. The swaps have 
become increasingly popular due to more favourable conditions as they are generally 
cheaper and less time-consuming than futures and forwards (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). 
The swaps are traded OTC and make, like futures and forwards, both parties obligated to 
fulfil the agreement and they normally have no market value at initiation.  
 
5.2 Freight Rate Risk 
 
Fluctuating freight rates are the most substantial source of risk faced by shipowners, the 
reason for this is simply that the freight is their primary earnings. Freight rate risk can be 
reduced by securing long-term contracts for the vessels; this is a traditional way of managing 
this type of risk. A more modern way of managing freight rate risk is to purchase financial 
derivatives contracts such as futures, forwards or options. 
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5.2.1 Traditional Risk Management 
As pointed out in 2.3.1 there are four main contracts in which freight can be sold in the 
freight market, and these contracts have different consequences concerning risk for the 
shipowner.  
When the shipowner trades voyage charters in the spot market he provides transport for a 
specific cargo from port A to port B for a fixed price per ton. The owner will then be subject 
to most of the risk because he will be operating the ship and voyage costs will be on his 
account. And since the fluctuating bunker prices accounts for a large part of voyage costs, 
this will cause a significant risk element.  
The Contract of Affreightment (COA) builds on the same principles as the voyage charter but 
is slightly more complex. The shipowner agrees to carry a series of cargo from port A to port 
B at within a given time period. The shipowner will take on most of the risk because he is still 
operating the vessel and pays for voyage costs. Although the agreed price paid by the 
charterer is supposed to cover these costs, the fluctuating bunker prices might still cause a 
significant risk element. A problem that may arise regarding COAs is that the exact volume 
and timing of the shipments are not usually known in advance. COA is very common in the 
dry bulk cargoes of iron ore and coal, where the major customers are the steel mills of 
Europe and the Far East (Stopford, 2009).  
A time charter may last from one voyage to several years where the agreed rate is fixed and 
paid on a daily or monthly basis. The time charter is often used by the shipowner as security 
for bank loans because then the bank will know that the company will receive a constant 
inflow. The charterer rents the vessel complete with a crew, and he is also responsible for 
the fluctuating voyage costs. The risk is thus mainly on the charterers account, whereas the 
shipowner’s risk is limited to the less volatile operating costs. However, the shipowner will 
still face a credit risk where the counterparty is unable to pay the settled charter rate.  
A Bare Boat Charter is arranged when a company wishes to have full operational control of a 
vessel without owning it. Under this arrangement an investor, normally a financial institution 
looking for a new profitable investment, purchases a ship and rents it out to a charterer for a 
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specific time period, typically 10-20 years. The charterer will then manage the vessel and pay 
both operational and voyage expenses.  
Advantages generated by a bare boat charter are that the charterer does not tie up its 
capital through buying a ship, and the shipowner may achieve a tax benefit. Hence, under a 
bare boat contract the charterer is exposed to most of the risks. And the shipowner will not 
be subject to any substantial risk, except for credit risk and default risk. 
A weakness in the spot market is that generally the rates here are more volatile and 
uncertain than time charter rates. This may however vary with market cycles. Kavussanos 
(2002) argues that when the market is low, time charters are more volatile than spot rates. 
The reason for this is that time charter rates reflect expectations of future events which 
makes them more responsive to changing perceptions of the future market. When for 
instance the market is at the bottom and the market is believed to climb, charterers rush to 
fix vessels on time charters to exploit the low rates before they increase.  
Operating in the spot market will be riskier as the owners are exposed to the fluctuating 
voyage costs. In addition, the owner faces the risk of not finding employment for the ship 
and there may thus be periods of it being idle, causing productivity loss for the owner. 
Relocation costs are also a risk element when operating in the spot market. These costs 
occur when the vessel is unable to find employment in the same port as where the current 
cargo is being discharged. On top of all this, administration costs are also higher in the spot 
market as it is more costly to administer for instance 12 voyages instead of just one.  
What kind of contract the vessel is operating on depends on the owner’s personal skills and 
interests. A risk averse shipowner would prefer to trade in the time charter market instead 
of the more volatile spot market as a type of risk management strategy. 
5.2.2 Vessel Size 
Even though vessel size is not classified as a way of managing risk, this will still be of some 
importance. Kavussanos (2002) found that ship size also has a certain impact on risk 
exposure, and he argues that volatilities, and thus risks, vary over time and across vessel 
sizes. Smaller vessels are more flexible than larger vessels simply because they can approach 
more ports and they can more easily switch between different trades and routes. Operating 
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unit costs are, however, higher for smaller vessels because they cannot exploit the 
economies of scale that larger vessels facilitate. Since smaller vessels are more flexible and 
have a lower risk of unemployment they are less risky than larger vessels and the volatility of 
their freight rates are consequently lower. So, by investing in smaller vessels the shipowner 
can reduce the freight rate risk.  
Kavussanos’ (2002) results thus suggest that operational risks in shipping may be diversified 
away by investing in smaller vessels. However, Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) argue that as 
the duration of the contracts are increased, it seems that the freight rate volatilities by 
different ship sizes are eliminated. Investing in smaller vessels for pure diversification effects 
is therefore not applicable when the owner is planning to operate in the long-term time 
charter market. A risk averse shipowner planning on operating in the spot market would 
thus invest in Handysize and Handymax vessels as opposed to the more volatile and less 
flexible Capesize and Panamax. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how volatile the spot and time charter freight rates are over a given 
period of time for the segments Handysize, Panamax and Capesize. It is clear from the charts 
that the spot rates in general have a higher variability than the time charter rates, and that 
the larger vessel sizes have a higher variability than the smaller. 
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Figure 5.1 The volatility of spot freight rates by vessel size 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The volatility of time charter rates by vessel size 
 
     Source: Kavussanos (2002, p. 673) 
 
5.2.3 Freight Rate Derivatives 
A freight rate derivative is a financial contract between two parties to deliver sea transport 
at an agreed future price and date. The contract does not involve any physical exchange of 
freight and no actual ship is involved. The contract is simply settled in cash on the difference 
between the actual spot rate and the agreed rate. The underlying asset for a freight 
derivative is a service and not a storable commodity that can be physically delivered. The 
underlying asset is therefore an index provided by the Baltic Exchange. This index is more or 
less an accurate reflection of the real global spot market and is based on the average of daily 
fixtures for different types of ships.  
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For the shipowner seeking employment for his vessel, lower levels of freight rate is 
equivalent to reduced income. Freight rate derivatives can be used to hedge the risk of 
lower freight rates and thus reduce income volatility. Because the shipowner takes the 
opposite position when he hedges in the derivatives market than he has in the physical 
market, the flows from the derivatives contracts will balance the gains or losses of the 
physical contracts (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006b).  
 
5.2.3.1 Parties Involved in the Freight Derivatives Market 
Several parties are involved in the freight derivatives market in order to make the trade 
happen and to make transactions efficient. IMAREX, NOS and the Baltic Exchange are the 
most important parties for the dry bulk derivatives industry.  
IMAREX 
The International Maritime Exchange is a Norwegian company founded in 2000 with the 
purpose of being a freight derivatives market. Since then the company has grown to become 
a large diversified group acting as intermediary and clearer for physical and derivative 
commodity transactions worth over USD 200 billion annually. In addition to offering a 
market place and clearing, IMAREX provides market analysis, information services and 
training to existing and new customers. As the world’s only regulated market for maritime 
derivatives, IMAREX offers tanker, dry bulk and bunker fuel oil derivatives through Freight 
Forward Agreements, Futures and options (IMAREX, 2009). 
NOS 
NOS Clearing (The Norwegian Futures and Options Clearing House) is a fully owned 
subsidiary of IMAREX ASA.  NOS offers clearing services for the derivatives traded via 
IMAREX with the purpose of reducing counterparty risk for the market agents and 
intermediaries trading the derivatives. NOS operates under license of the Ministry of Finance 
and is also approved by the American Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to 
carry out clearing of trades on IMAREX. In the clearing process, NOS acts as the counterparty 
between the buyer and the seller of a derivative contract, and thereby guarantees fulfilment 
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of the contract. The revenue from these actions is collected through a margin paid by the 
buyer and the seller (IMAREX, 2009). 
The Baltic Exchange 
The Baltic Exchange is a privately owned company offering independent daily shipping 
market information, in addition the company maintains professional shipbroking standards 
and resolve disputes. The Baltic Exchange plays a vital role in shipping market assessment; 
by using a panel of international shipbrokers employed worldwide the company is able to 
facilitate indices used as underlying values for shipping derivatives. The company thus 
provides daily assessments on more than 50 dry and wet routes, weekly sale & purchase and 
demolition assessments in addition to daily forward rates. For the dry bulk market, The 
Baltic Exchange provides indices for the Capesize (BCI), Panamax (BPI), Handysize (BHI) and 
Supramax (BSI) segments, in addition it offers assessments through the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) 
which is an average of all the four sub-segments (The Baltic Exchange, 2009). 
 
5.2.3.2 Futures 
The Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange (BIFFEX) contract was introduced by 
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) in 1985, and the 
London Clearing-House provided clearing of the contracts by guaranteeing fulfilment of the 
contracts and thus eliminating counterparty risk (Nomikos & Alizadeh, 2002). The underlying 
value of the BIFFEX was the Baltic Freight Index (BFI) provided by the Baltic Exchange. The 
BIFFEX disappeared from the market in 2002 partly because of the more popular and more 
flexible forward contract, and partly because of the unsatisfactory hedging effectiveness and 
lack of liquidity (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). 
The freight futures contract is, however, available today as it was re-launched by IMAREX in 
June 2006. The contract is marked-to-market daily and it is cash settled with no physical 
delivery. The underlying indices are provided by The Baltic Exchange and fulfilment of the 
contract is guaranteed by NOS Clearing ASA. The contracts are sold as index products with 
BDI as underlying index, and as single route products with 6 individual routes being the 
underlying indices. In addition, the futures contracts can be based on time charter baskets 
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for Capesize, Panamax, Handysize and Supramax (IMAREX, 2009). The BDIFutures contracts 
are used for trading on directions, for trading as a hedge against dry bulk equities and for 
trading as a spread against FFAs. 
 
5.2.3.3 Forwards (FFA) 
The Forward Freight Agreement (FFA) became available to market agents in 1992 as an 
alternative to BIFFEX, it was according to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) introduced by 
Clarksons in association with the Baltic Exchange with the purpose of accomplishing better 
hedges. The FFA is essentially a more flexible futures contract, only it is OTC traded and 
settled through the principle of “contracts for differences” (CDF). This means that the price 
of the contracts is agreed at initiation and upon settlement only the difference between the 
settlement price and the agreed price is being transferred between the counterparties.  
Normally, shipowners are sellers of FFAs and they engage in the FFA market simply because 
if freight rates drop, the reduction in the freight income for the owner will be compensated 
through a gain in the forward position. The general aim of FFAs is to hedge exposures, but 
they can also be used for speculating purposes by taking a bet on the future direction of the 
freight markets. Owners and charterers are the natural players in the freight derivatives 
market and make up 85 per cent of dry bulk FFA trades; the last 15 per cent consist of 
financials who enter the market for speculating purposes (The Baltic Exchange, 2009).  
Unlike BIFFEX, whose underlying asset was the BFI, FFA contracts are written on individual 
route indices of the Baltic Dry Index. FFAs are traded both for trip time charter routes and 
for longer term time charter and there are one index provided for each sub-segment of the 
dry bulk market (The Baltic Exchange, 2009). 
Figure 5.3 shows number of dry bulk FFAs traded via IMAREX and cleared by NOS. In 
addition, it illustrates nominal trade value denominated in USD. It is evident that the 
contract has become increasingly popular as both volume traded and the nominal value 
have had a massive growth since IMAREX started trading FFAs. So far in 2009 IMAREX has 
registered 900 trades with a nominal value of USD 669 million which is a remarkable 
increase from 2003 with 26 trades and a nominal value of USD 177 million.  
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Figure 5.3 Number of dry bulk FFAs traded at IMAREX from 2003 
 
                   Source: IMAREX 
 
5.2.3.4. Hybrid FFAs 
The hybrid FFA was developed in September 2005 as a reaction to the demands of market 
participants to deal with the issue of credit risk in forward contracts. The hybrid FFA is 
similar to the standard FFAs, however, they are cleared through LCH.Clearnet. The contracts 
have the benefits of being flexible in terms of size and delivery and in addition the credit risk 
is eliminated, although participants need to pay a fee in order to do this. Currently, for the 
dry bulk industry, LCH.Clearnet offers clearing for four dry voyage FFAs and two dry trip time 
charter FFAs (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006b).  
 
5.2.3.5 Options 
A freight option is a financially settled derivative contract which gives the holder the right 
but not the obligation to buy (call) or sell (put) an FFA at a negotiated price.  
Option contracts were introduced to the shipping industry in 1990 when trading on options 
on BIFFEX available from LIFFE started. However, regardless of their flexibility, the options 
were only regarded as insurance rather than a derivative because maximum loss was the 
premium paid for the contract; the contract thus ceased trading in April 2002 (Nomikos & 
Alizadeh, 2002). 
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The dry bulk option contract was, however, reintroduced by IMAREX in April 2006 and is 
available today as call and put Asian style options whose expiration value depends on the 
average value of the index over a specific period. The options offered today by IMAREX are 
either completed OTC or they are cleared through NOS. The options available are index 
options based on BDI or on 6 individual routes provided by the Baltic Exchange (IMAREX, 
2009). 
A shipowner will buy a put option which gives him the right but not the obligation to sell his 
freight service in the future at an agreed price today. He will exercise the option only if the 
freight market falls below the agreed price, the option is then ITM. The shipowner will have 
to pay a premium to purchase the option and maximum cost is therefore the premium, the 
gain on the other hand is unlimited, just as for FFAs and futures. 
Figure 5.4 Number of freight options and the nominal value traded at IMAREX 
 
                    Source: IMAREX 
 
5.3 Bunker Price Risk 
 
In general, vessels use bunker fuel for propulsion and diesel oil for manoeuvring in ports and 
for electricity generators (Nomikos & Alizadeh, 2002). Bunker fuel is the final product of a 
simple distillation of crude oil, and will therefore generally tend to move in line with crude 
oil prices which have historically been volatile. Bunker fuel costs account for a substantial 
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part of total voyage costs and the owner or the charterer, depending on the contract, is 
therefore exposed to the large bunker price fluctuations.  
The price of bunker fuel is generally determined by demand and supply which is influenced 
by the number of vessels in the need of fuel and the number of oil companies and refineries 
respectively. In addition, Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) have identified several other 
economic factors influencing the bunker market. The oil market will affect the bunker price 
in terms of fluctuating oil prices, if the price of crude oil increases for instance, so will the 
products derived from it. The second factor is changes in the bunker stock levels. A potential 
reduction in stock of bunker will make the prices rise. A shortage of bunker may be 
intentionally created in order to force prices up; a sudden increase in price however, will 
result in an equally dramatic fall. This will ultimately contribute to increase the market 
volatility even further. The practices of the diverse refineries may as well affect the bunker 
market. Bunker fuel is often the least important market for refineries because it only 
represents less than 5 per cent of the value of all petroleum products traded worldwide. A 
fall in bunker prices in one port may affect the prices in another port; this is why changes in 
overseas competition also will influence the bunker market. Changes in local markets in 
terms of new market entries will affect the market share of the existing participants and 
especially since new entrants often offer low prices in order to attract customers. The next 
factor is the delivery methods, referring to the way the bunkering is done; this could be by 
using barges or directly from storage tanks.  
The final variable is the unpredictable factors including weather incidents, port delays, OPEC 
decisions, political events, field shut downs and storage availability.   
Even though most ports have bunkering facilities, the world bunker market is divided into 
three main regional markets. The largest is Singapore, followed by Rotterdam and Houston. 
The prices of bunker in these three markets differ slightly because they are all subject to 
local supply and demand. However, the prices also move together indicating that they are 
driven by a common variable, notably the world oil price.  
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the fluctuating prices of IFO 380 over the last two years in the three 
major ports. Singapore bunker prices ranged in this period from USD 210.50 to USD 761.50, 
and in the same period both Houston and Rotterdam bunker prices had similar fluctuating 
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prices with the ranges USD 200.00 – 763.00, and USD 165.00 – 729.50 respectively. This in 
turn illustrates the severe volatility and thus the need for hedging. 
Figure 5.5 Bunker fuel prices in the three major ports 
 
          Source: BunkerWorld 
5.3.1 Bunker Derivatives 
Different instruments and techniques have evolved over the last twenty years in order to 
reduce bunker price risk. Available tools for shipowners, operators and charterers are energy 
futures, forward bunker agreements, bunker options and bunker swaps. Market agents 
engage in bunker hedges in order to insulate themselves from sudden changes in the price 
of bunker fuel. Despite the benefits of hedging bunker price risk, Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2006a) found that only a limited number of market agents actually hedge this risk. The 
reason for this is that the companies involved wants to benefit from price movements if the 
market moves in their favour. 
 
5.3.1.1 Futures 
The futures contract gives the buyer the right to buy a certain amount of bunker fuel in the 
future. Futures contracts for hedging bunker prices did not exist until IMAREX launched an 
electronic screen market for trading bunker fuel contracts in December 2005. These 
contracts are, as all other IMAREX traded contracts, cleared through NOS. The futures 
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contracts involve cross-hedging bunker fuels with futures contracts that have energy 
products as the underlying commodities, and are offered on five different types of bunker 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a).   
 
5.3.1.2 Forwards 
A forward bunker agreement is generally a futures contract, only it is customised in terms of 
delivery, amount and price. Although physical delivery is possible, the main settlement is 
made on the difference between the forward price and the spot price of bunker at delivery. 
The contracts are offered by investment banks and companies trading bunkers, which 
receive a commission on the total amount payable for their services.   
 
5.3.1.3 Options 
No exchanges are currently trading bunker option agreements, they are only available OTC. 
If exchange traded options are highly desired, they are available as cross-hedges by using 
energy options as proxies. The incentive behind this cross-hedge is that when the futures are 
traded on an organised exchange the counterparty risk is eliminated because a clearing 
house will then guarantee fulfilment (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). 
 
5.3.1.4 Swaps 
A simple bunker swap agreement is a contract that gives the holder the right to exchange a 
floating price for bunker for a fixed price over a certain time period for a specified volume of 
bunker fuel. Because the time period is divided into several sub-periods, the swap can be 
seen as a portfolio of forward contracts. The contracts are traded OTC and there is no 
physical exchange of fuel, the agreement is only settled in cash. Because it is OTC traded 
credit risk is an important issue and the counterparties both have to agree to trade with one 
another and thus they both accept the risk of counterparty failure.  
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5.4 Exchange Rate Risk  
 
Changes in the value of currencies influencing the value of an asset or liability are a source of 
risk which ultimately will affect the shipowner’s cash flow. Most international business ends 
with a payment where one currency is exchanged for another. And as exchange rates 
fluctuate on a daily basis, the cash outflows and inflows will change accordingly. Exchange 
rates can hardly be accurately forecasted, the company can however measure its exposure 
and categorise it in order to decide whether to hedge this exposure or not.  
Madura and Fox (2007); Buckley (2004); and Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) emphasise that 
there are three different types of foreign exchange exposure. The first is the transaction 
exposure which refers to how exchange rate fluctuations affect the value of the future cash 
transactions. Economic exposure is a general term for the financial effects of exchange rate 
fluctuations; it includes transaction exposure and indirect effects on revenues and 
expenditures. Economic exposure thus refers to how a change in the exchange rates will 
influence the present value of future cash flows. Translation exposure is a term related to 
the consolidated financial statements of a multinational company (MNC). This exposure is 
mainly an issue for large companies with affiliates abroad whose earnings are denominated 
in different currencies than the parent company. The exposures most commonly hedged are 
transaction and translation exposure. 
Because shipowners operate in such an international industry, they may be subject to 
fluctuations in several currencies. Most shipping companies operate in US dollars because 
the rates are predominantly in this currency, whereas the expenses are mainly in Japanese 
Yen paid to the yards building the vessels. For a company based in Norway, different 
expenditures such as administration costs, wages, and repair and maintenance may be in 
NOK. In addition, principal and interest payments on a bank loan may be in a different 
currency than the shipowner’s reserves. Hence a company based in Norway may be subject 
to more than four different exchange rates. 
The price of a currency is determined by demand and supply. However, there are different 
factors affecting supply and demand causing movements in the price of the currency. 
Madura and Fox (2004, p. 127) illustrates how the price of a currency is a function of the 
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inflation differential (INF), the interest rates differential (INT), the income differential (INC),  
differences in government control (GC) and expected future exchange rates (EXP) of the 
respective currencies.       denotes the percentage change, or the differential between the 
two countries. 
E= f (      INF,     INT,       INC,     GC,       EXP) 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) support this, but add a few more factors; monetary policies, 
trade surplus or deficit, economic growth levels, intervention tactics by central banks, the 
level of political, social, business security and stability in each of the economies in question. 
All these factors will influence the exchange rates and make the currencies fluctuate causing 
a great risk for companies trading in these currencies. 
Figure 5.6 shows the historical exchange rate between NOK and USD the last 120 days from 
the end of November 2008 until mid May 2009. It is from this chart apparent that exchange 
rates are rather volatile and how this volatility can affect the cash flows of any company 
trading in these currencies. For instance, a payment due in March 2009 would have been 
much higher than if it were due during the end of the same month. This volatility facilitates 
an incentive to hedge and to speculate on currency movements. 
Figure 5.6 The volatile exchange rate between NOK and USD 
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5.4.1 Natural Hedge 
A natural hedge is implemented through funding the operations and assets in the same 
currencies as the income. Since the income in the shipping industry is mainly denominated in 
USD, financing the vessels in USD will be a natural hedge because the adverse impact of the 
exchange rate variations on cash inflows will be offset by the effect on cash outflows.   
5.4.2 Money Market Hedge 
A money market hedge involves taking a money market position to cover a future payable or 
receivable position. A money market hedge on a receivable amount in USD involves 
borrowing the present value of the receivable amount in USD, followed by an exchange to 
NOK. The NOK amount will be deposited in a bank account in Norway, and when the USD is 
received after six months, it is used to pay off the loan granted in USD six months earlier. 
When taking interest rates on the bank deposit into consideration, a very small gain can be 
achieved by doing this, but the main intention is to eliminate uncertainty regarding exchange 
rate movements (Madura & Fox, 2007). A money market hedge on a payable amount 
involves roughly the same actions, only vice versa. 
5.4.3 Foreign Currency Derivatives 
A currency derivative is a contract whose price is derived from the value and price behaviour 
of the underlying currency that it represents. The underlying value is thus the actual 
exchange rate of the two currencies concerned.  To hedge a foreign exchange exposure, the 
market agent takes a position in the derivative market which is opposite of his exposure in 
the spot market.  
 
5.4.3.1 Currency Futures 
Currency futures are obligations to buy or sell one currency for another in the future. 
Currency futures are standardised and traded only on organised exchanges and guaranteed 
by a clearinghouse with the purpose of eliminating credit risk. Currency futures are 
commonly used by large multinational companies to hedge foreign currency exposures and 
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they are also traded by speculators who aim at capitalising on their expectations of exchange 
rate movements. In order to speculate in futures contracts the participants purchase a 
futures contract and lock in the price of say USD, on the settlement date in the future they 
buy the dollars at the rate specified in the contract, and then they will sell the USD at the 
spot rate if the USD has appreciated and will thus profit (Madura & Fox, 2007).  
 
5.4.3.2 Currency Forwards  
A currency forward contract is essentially a futures contract, except it is more flexible in 
terms of quantity, quality, maturity and the way it is traded. The forward rate is determined 
by market expectations of the future spot rate, which in turn depends on the variables 
influencing the exchange rate. Firms use currency forwards in the same way as they use 
futures, and the aim is to insulate itself against an expected increase in the value of a 
currency regarding an outflow, and decrease in the value regarding an inflow (Kavussanos & 
Visvikis, 2006a). 
 
5.4.3.3 Currency Options 
Currency option contracts gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to buy (call) or sell 
(put) a currency at a specified date in the future. Currency options are traded both as OTC 
and on organised exchanges with clearing services provided by clearing houses.  
 
5.4.3.4 Currency Swaps 
Currency swaps are according to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a) derivative contracts that 
give two counterparties the right to exchange an agreed amount of a currency for another 
currency at a certain future date. Basically it concerns the swap of a principal amount of 
debt for another. For example if a Norwegian company with a good reputation domestically 
needs to raise funds in USD, but is not very well known in the U.S. and cannot as easily be 
granted a loan, then it could raise the money in NOK just to swap it into USD. The 
counterparty could either be a bank or another company in the need of an equivalent 
amount of NOK. If the counterparty is another company a financial institution will commonly 
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put the deal together by acting as an intermediary and eliminate counterparty risk. The most 
frequently used currency swaps have floating rates on both sides, but swaps are also 
available for fixed rates. A currency swap usually involves three basic steps. First there is an 
initial exchange of principal, followed by ongoing exchange of interest rates, and finally the 
re-exchange of principal amounts at maturity.  
Reasons for entering into a currency swap are plentiful and involve hedging a currency 
exposure as well as for pure speculating purposes, it could also be to obtain funds at lower 
costs, obtaining access to restricted markets or altering the currency of a payment stream or 
investment income (Buckley, 2004).  
 
5.5 Interest Rate Risk 
 
As one of the main characteristics of the shipping industry is its capital intensiveness, 
payment of debt and interests plays a key role for shipowners. Vessel prices vary over time 
along with the volatile freight rates and the market cycle, and among the different types of 
vessels. A new vessel may cost up to USD 150 million (International Maritime Organisation, 
2006) and a high gearing ratio among shipowners is therefore rather common. Sometimes 
debt is raised in order to cover as much as 80-90 per cent of the vessel’s value, although a 
normal debt to equity ratio is around 70 per cent (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). To facilitate 
funds for the purchase of a vessel, the companies may use shareholder equity, or they may 
borrow from commercial banks with specialised shipping branches, or directly from the 
public through bond issues. The value of the vessel will be used as security for the loan, 
which can be rather worrying in times when vessel values are depreciating.  
The cost of the borrowed capital changes as interest rates in the world change. These 
movements in interest rates cause unstable cash flows for the shipping companies. And the 
greater the financial leverage of the company is, the larger is its exposure to interest rate 
risk. The shipowners should be concerned with interest rate levels both with respect to their 
borrowed funds and their bank deposits. And one of the main decisions to make is the 
choice between a fixed and a floating interest rate.  
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In order to understand why interest rates move, it is vital to understand the factors 
determining the interest rates. Bodie, et al. (2008, p. 124) have identified three fundamental 
factors. Firstly, the supply of funds from savers, primarily households, will affect the interest 
rate level. The second factor is the demand for funds from businesses to be used to finance 
investments in factories, equipment, and inventories. Finally, the government’s net supply of 
or demand for funds as modified by actions of the Federal Reserve Bank will influence the 
level of interest rates.   
5.5.1 Interest Rate Derivatives  
The underlying assets of interest rate derivatives differ according to the type of derivative 
contract. Generally the underlying assets of interest derivatives are cash instruments such as 
T-bonds, T-notes, T-bills and Eurodollars as well as LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). 
As a response to volatile interest rates, the large amounts of government debt and the 
desire to reduce exposure, exchange traded interest futures were introduced in 1975 and 
the first OTC interest swap agreements was entered in 1981 (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). 
Since then several instruments for hedging interest rate risk have been introduced to market 
agents for the purpose of either protecting the value of the firm’s financial assets or to lock 
in favourable interest rates for the finance of their investments. The instruments include 
forward rate agreements, caps and floors, and hybrid instruments such as forward swaps, 
options on swaps (swaptions), and options on options (captions) (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 
2006a). 
 
5.5.1.1 Futures 
Interest rate futures are agreements giving the holder the right to buy or sell interest rate 
payments on a hypothetical principal amount at a given future date. Interest rate futures are 
exchange traded standardised agreements, and the nature of these contracts is the same as 
for all futures contracts; standardised, exchange traded, liquid and simple to use.  
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5.5.1.2 Forwards 
A forward rate agreement (FRA) is a customised OTC traded contract and have been traded 
among major international banks since 1983. The banks will use FRAs to fix interest costs on 
expected future deposits or interest revenues on floating rate loans indexed to LIBOR 
(Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). A bank that sells FRAs consents to pay the purchaser of the 
contract the increased interest cost on a principal amount if this exceeds the forward rate on 
the maturity date. Correspondingly, the buyer agrees to pay the seller any decrease in 
interest cost if market interest rates fall below the forward rate. No actual principal is 
exchanged, only the present value of the net interest owed is being transferred from one 
party to the other. 
 
5.5.1.3 Options 
Option contracts may be applied to the interest rate markets through the use of caps, floors 
and collars.  
A cap is similar to an insurance policy for a company aiming at protecting itself against a rise 
in interest rates above a certain level. At the same time, however, the firm is hoping to take 
advantage of any future drop in the rates (Buckley, 2004). These contracts are OTC traded 
and can be customised to match the payment schedule of any floating-rate loan and to 
match nearly any interest rate maturity up to one year. The financial institutions writing the 
cap agree to compensate the company if the market index, for instance LIBOR, exceeds the 
cap rate. The holder of the cap thus continues to pay LIBOR plus a margin on its underlying 
loan; however he expects to be compensated if LIBOR exceed the interest rate level agreed 
upon in the contract. 
An interest rate floor is essentially the same concept as a cap, only it has the reverse effect. 
The lender is now compensated of changing levels of interest rate. The investor or lender is 
thus protected from a fall in interest rates that falls below the floor rate, at the same time it 
allows the investor to benefit from any rise in the rates. 
A third type of option contract is the collar, which is a combination of a floor and a cap. It 
gives the holder protection against rates rising above a certain level, the cap, and the ability 
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to take advantage of a fall in rates as long as this does not go below the limit represented by 
the floor rate. If the interest rate rises above the cap rate, the holder is compensated by the 
counterparty, whereas the holder has to compensate the counterparty if rates fall below the 
floor (Buckley, 2004). 
 
5.5.1.4 Swaps  
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two counterparties to exchange a series of 
interest payments or investment income in the same currency on an agreed amount of 
principal for an agreed time period. Normally, an interest rate swap involves the exchange of 
a series of fixed interest payments for a series of floating rate payments or vice versa 
(Buckley, 2004).  If a company expects the interest rates to rise, it could enter a swap 
agreement to pay fixed and receive floating payments with the purpose of insulating itself 
from increased levels of interests, and thus increased payments on debt. Conversely, if a 
company believes that the rates will fall, it could enter a swap contract and at the same time 
consenting to pay floating and receive fixed payments, the company will thus experience 
reduced debt payments. Only the net differential between the floating and fixed payments 
are being exchanged on the settlement date, the principal amount is not being swapped.  
The most frequently used interest rate swap is the fixed-for-floating rate swap, also referred 
to as a plain vanilla swap. In this type of contract fixed-rate payers make payments on a 
long-term interest rate to a floating-rate payer, the floating-rate payer will then make 
payments indexed to a short-term money market rate to the fixed-rate payer. The company 
is thus protected against increases in interest rates as well as the future interest payments 
are now stable and predictable (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006a). 
An interest rate swap agreement can be entered for several reasons; the focal objectives 
include achieving funding at rates below those otherwise available in the market, obtaining 
fixed rate financing when bond markets are unfeasible to access directly, restructuring a 
debt profile without raising new finance or simply restructuring the profile of interest 
payments or receipts. The final objectives and the most common are to hedge against or 
speculate upon the movements in interest rates (Buckley, 2004).  
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5.6 Credit Risk 
 
A shipowner may be exposed to credit risk in two different situations. The first situation 
relates to a counterparty being unable to perform under the time or voyage charter and is 
unable to pay its obligations when due. The second type of credit risk is related to the 
default of the counterparty of a derivatives contract. 
Credit risk has especially been a problem the last few months due to the global economic 
downturn. Several companies have gone bankrupt or defaulted on their obligations due to 
the credit crunch.  
The difficulties in assessing credit risk are to calculate the probability of default as well as 
estimating the recovery rate and the potential loss given default. Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2006a) have identified the following complicating issues embedded in the calculation of 
credit risk. Credit exposure is an increasing function of time; this is because the value of the 
contract may increase over time. Hence, the longer the duration of a contract, the greater is 
the credit risk involved. And as time passes, the credit risk of the contract is usually reduced 
if the counterparty has already made cash flow payments on a contract with a positive value. 
Moreover, measuring default probabilities are difficult in general, and current positions may 
not represent future credit risk.  
Different ways to manage credit risk is to assess the counterparties and rate them according 
to their creditworthiness. One can for instance place bank deposits and enter derivative 
financial instruments only with highly rated financial institutions and banks. Other ways to 
manage credit risk is to monitor this risk on a daily basis and only deal with major and 
financially strong shipping companies with a good reputation. 
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6. Case Study 
 
In order to see what sort of risk management instruments are being employed in practice, 
this paper will perform a case study and thus analyse two ship owning companies operating 
within the dry bulk industry. The first company is Golden Ocean Group Limited, a pure dry 
bulk carrier owner and operator. The second company is Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA which is a 
diversified company with interests within various shipping segments. Information about the 
companies is primarily taken from their respective 2007 and 2008 annual reports, from their 
quarterly reports, press releases and from their web sites.  
 
6.1 Golden Ocean Group Limited 
 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited (GOGL) is a dry bulk shipping company listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange since 15 December 2004. GOGL demerged from Frontline Limited in order to take 
care of the dry bulk fleet to best realise the value of these vessels for the benefit of its 
shareholders, and at the same time allowing Frontline to focus on the oil tanker sector.  
Soon after the establishment of GOGL, the company founded its own management 
companies, Golden Ocean Management AS in Oslo and Golden Ocean Management Asia Pte 
Ltd in Singapore, to take care of all management services. The management’s strategy is to 
outsource large parts of the operations to independent and competing ship management 
companies, these operations include ship management, crewing, and accounting services. 
The principal activities of the group in addition to ship ownership and operation, involves 
charter, purchase and sale of vessels.  
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6.1.1 Fleet 
The group mainly operates in the Capesize and Panamax markets with a fleet consisting of 
30 owned vessels, 15 chartered, 4 bareboat agreements and 10 vessels under commercial 
management. Hence at the moment (March 2009) GOGL controls 59 vessels. Of these 59 
vessels, 28 are newbuildings with delivery from 2009 until 2011, of which 12 are of the new 
vessel type Kamsarmax, which is a special bulk carrier sub-class and was according to 
Tsuneishi Group (Zhoushan) Shipbuilding Inc. developed in 2002 in response to an order of a 
Panamax carrier. 
Table 6.1 Golden Ocean’s fleet by March 2009 
Segment Capesize Panamax Kamsarmax OBO Total 
Number of vessels 3 20 0 8 31 
 Newbuildings 9 7 12 0 28 
Total 12 27 12 8 59 
 
Since the Kamsarmax is basically a sub-class of the Panamax, it can be said that GOGL only 
operates in the two largest and also least flexible segments, as pointed out in section 5.2.2. 
The group’s operations are thus strongly dependent on the development in the steel, coal 
and grain markets. 
The fact that GOGL only operates in the largest dry bulk segments suggests that the 
company is not very risk averse. However, the main reason for GOGL’s choice of vessel size is 
the expertise the company possesses in these segments and the trades that follows the 
segments. Another reason for the preference of large size vessels is the exploitation of 
economies of scale that these vessels facilitate.  
6.1.2 Key Numbers 
Total revenues from voyage and time charter in 2008 amounted to USD 877.3 million, which 
is a remarkable increase from the 2007 revenues of USD 704 million. 2007 was a good year 
for GOGL with a profit of USD 200.9 million, net profit of 2008, however, practically doubled 
from the previous year despite plummeting rates in the second half of the year, ending up at 
USD 380.1 million.  
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Table 6.2 Golden Ocean’s key numbers in million USD 
 
GOGL did rather well in 2008 even with the international financial crisis breathing down its 
neck. Still, the group had to face major losses regarding decreased value of its shares, 
cancellations on charters on three vessels, loss on sale of vessels and loss on charter hire 
expenses. From the numbers in the 1st quarter report 2009 it is obvious that GOGL’s revenue 
is finally affected by the low rates and reduced activity in the market. The revenue was 
reduced with over 80 per cent from the previous year, and if the group has not given any 
discount on their long term time charters, it is the vessels operating in the spot market 
which are responsible for this low revenue. Even though the profit in 2008 was remarkably 
high, the remaining cash at the end of the year was rather low compared to the previous 
year. The reason for this is the massive payment of dividends amounting to USD 347 million, 
as well as increased repayment of debt and purchase of own shares. 
6.1.3 Capital Structure and Taxes 
Golden Ocean’s gearing ratio in 2008 was 80 per cent, which was just an insignificant 
increase from the previous year with 79.3 per cent. This debt-to-equity ratio is rather high 
and GOGL would thus according to Grinblatt and Titman’s findings outlined in section 4.3 
have a great incentive to implement hedging strategies.  
Golden Ocean Group Ltd was incorporated and its registered address is in Bermuda. 
Bermuda is one of the most popular flags of convenience in which companies register in 
order to achieve lower costs and tax benefits. In Bermuda there is currently no income, 
corporation, or profits tax. Hence it is only the management subsidiaries of GOGL that are 
subject to taxation in Norway and Singapore, in which the payable amounts reached USD 
 2008 2007 1Q 2009 1Q 2008 
Total Value 1,006.7 1,183.8 920 1,149 
Revenue (freight income) 877.3 704 67.9 218.8 
Net Profit 380.1 200.9 16.3 53.7 
Cash Flow 50.9 306.2 29.2 166.5 
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59,000 and USD 0 respectively in 2008. The capital structure of GOGL is therefore not 
affected by taxes, only by the costs of financial distress.  
6.1.4 Stock Price Development       
  
The Golden Ocean share has historically been volatile but normally with quarterly dividend 
payouts to the owners. Fully diluted earnings per share in 2008 amounted to USD 1.360 as 
opposed to USD 0.713 the previous year. The pattern of the stock has roughly followed the 
development of the Baltic Dry Index and the dry bulk industry in general see figure 6.1 
where the blue line with the highest values indicates GOGL’s stock, whereas the red line 
under represents the Baltic Dry Index.   
Figure 6.1 Golden Ocean’s stock development during the last two years 
 
During the last two years GOGL’s share value reached a top of NOK 44.20 29 October 2007. 
The stock value remained fairly high the next year and through the shipping boom of 2007 
and 2008. However, the value of the stock experienced a remarkable drop from August 2008 
and reached its lowest reported value of NOK 1.51 2 March 2009. 
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Table 6.3 Key numbers concerning Golden Ocean’s shares 
 Current share value (19 May) NOK 6.25 
Top value (October 2007) NOK 44.20 
Bottom value (March 2009) NOK 1.51 
Development last 12 months -81.57 % 
So far this year 39.51 % 
         Source: Oslo Børs 
The share is very liquid and is listed on Oslo Børs’ OBX list and the number of shares traded 
so far this year amounts to almost 1.5 billion. As of the middle of May, the share’s value is 
NOK 6.25 which implies a market value of NOK 2,834.31 million (Oslo Børs).  
6.1.5 Risk Exposure 
Through its activities in the international nature of the shipping industry, the group is 
exposed to a variety of risks. Market risk includes currency risk, interest rate risk, and freight 
rate risk and comprises the largest risk elements for the company. In addition, the company 
is exposed to fluctuations in bunker fuel, and credit risk has lately become an increasing 
issue due to the international financial crisis where several counterparties have failed to 
meet their obligations. The overall risk programme of the group focuses on unpredictable 
financial markets and aims to minimise potential adverse effects on the group’s financial 
performance. 
 
6.1.5.1 Freight Rate Risk 
Golden Ocean is through its operations well exposed to the fluctuating freight rates as more 
than 99 per cent of the revenue relates to chartering operations. The group operates both in 
the spot market and in the longer term time charter market. The two last years, however, 
the company has implemented a rather conservative chartering policy where a major part of 
the tonnage is fixed on long-term time charter agreements and several vessels are sold in 
the second-hand market to secure financial resources with the intention of expanding the 
fleet through the newbuilding market. Number of ships operated in the spot market as 
opposed to in the time charter market varies, but according to Elin Saugestad senior 
accountant of GOGL, an average for the last year shows that 50-60 per cent of the fleet was 
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let on long-term time charter agreements. Moreover, the 1st quarter report 2009 reported 
that GOGL’s spot exposure in 2009 is for the Panamax segment 35 per cent and for the 
Capesize segment 3 per cent, this exposure tends to increase in the future, but that is due to 
the expiration of the current long-term time charters.  
In addition, the group occasionally uses forward freight agreements (FFAs) to manage its 
exposure to the spot freight market rates for the vessels that are not operating in the long-
term market, and for speculating. The group did not, however, have any positions in the FFA 
market in 2008, in 2007 on the other hand, activities in the OTC FFA market created a total 
loss of USD 9.8 million as the company had assets in this market worth of USD 51 million and 
liabilities of USD 60.7 million. 
 
6.1.5.2 Bunker Price Fluctuations 
The group’s shipping operations are subject to fluctuating future rates, especially bunker 
price volatility. Although several of GOGL’s vessels are let on long-term time charters where 
the charterer is accountable for voyage costs, some of the vessels are also traded in the spot 
market and GOGL is thus exposed to bunker price fluctuations on these vessels, see section 
5.2.1. The group does not, however, hedge its bunker price exposure.  
 
6.1.5.3 Exchange Rate Risk 
The reporting currency as well as the majority of GOGL’s financial assets and liabilities is 
denominated in USD, and by 31 December 2008 there were no material assets or liabilities 
denominated in other currencies. Hence a foreign currency hedge would not be necessary.  
Although, the fact that all assets and liabilities are intentionally denominated in USD is a 
natural hedge in itself, see section 5.4.1. Because most of their income is in USD the 
company has also decided to finance its assets in USD so that the exchange of currencies is 
not required. However, due to the different locations of the parent and the two 
management subsidiaries, some of the costs, especially administration costs are 
denominated in local currencies. The group is accordingly exposed to movements in NOK 
and in Singapore dollars as well as USD.  
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The group is well aware of the fluctuating values of its assets and liabilities owing to changes 
in exchange rates, and thus monitors its exposure to currency risk on a regular basis. 
However, the company has decided not to use forward foreign exchange contracts to 
manage currency risk. The reason for this is that a sensitivity analysis performed by GOGL 
illustrates that if the exchange rate between USD and NOK increased 5 per cent cet. par. by 
31 December 2008, the decrease or increase in net assets would not be substantial. 
 
6.1.5.4 Interest Rate Risk 
The group is exposed to interest rate risk through movements in rates on interest rate 
bearing assets and liabilities. The exposure to interest rate movements are related to the 
gearing ratio of the company, see section 5.5.  
GOGL considers its interest rate risk exposure on a continuous basis, and the chief financial 
officer monitors sensitivity of interest rates on a regularly part of his role. The sensitivity of 
2008 was higher than in 2007 because of increased long-term debt due to the extensive 
newbuilding programme. However, by 31 December 2008 no interest rate hedges were held 
by the group. 
GOGL’s sensitivity analysis illustrates that an increase or decrease in the interest rate level of 
1 per cent cet. par. by 31 December 2008, would subsequently lead to an increase/decrease 
in profits of USD 1 million. This change in profit would generally be because of higher/lower 
interest expenses on the long-term debt with floating rates.  
 
6.1.5.5 Credit Risk 
The group monitors credit risk on a daily basis and manages this risk by concentrating on 
activities with major shipping companies and placing bank deposits only with highly rated 
financial institutions.  
By December 2008 more than 75 per cent of all cash and cash equivalents were held with 
four financial institutions with fairly high ratings according to Standard and Poor’s credit rate 
system. If independent ratings on the institutions do not exist, the credit control department 
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assesses the credit quality of the counterparty considering its financial position, past 
experience and other factors.  
By 31 December 2008 credit risk existed to the extent that approximately 64 per cent of the 
voyage related income was accounted for by four charterers, and 84 per cent of these four 
charterers’ payments were actually received. In addition, GOGL has calculated maximum 
credit risk exposure on cash and cash equivalents and trade and other receivables at 
December 2008 to be USD 130.6 million which is only approximately a third of the exposure 
the previous year.  
6.1.6 Consequences of the Financial Crisis 
Golden Ocean’s revenue and profit has actually increased despite the financial crisis that 
emerged towards the end of the year. However, the plunging rates and declining dry bulk 
market as a whole along with the insolvency of counterparties have resulted in losses for the 
group and its share value has dropped remarkably.  
The company has been subject to non-performing deals in terms of counterparties being 
unable to meet their obligations. One example is that the now bankrupt Britannia Bulk was 
to buy six Panamax newbuildings now under construction. In addition, only around half of 
the group’s newbuilding programme was financed whereas ten vessels were still left 
unfinanced by the end of February.  As a response to the current financial crisis, Golden 
Ocean has increased its focus on counterparty risk and chains of charterparties.  
As outlined in section 4.2.3, dividend reductions, falling stock prices and breach of covenants 
are signs of financial distress. Thus, it seems that the most severe consequence of the 
financial turmoil for Golden Ocean is financial distress mainly as a result of counterparties 
being unable to meet their obligations.  
In order to try to deal with the situation, the group has gone through financial restructuring 
in terms of negotiating with creditors and issuing new equities. After selling 80 per cent of 
the dry bulk company’s convertible USD 200 million bond issue to the largest shareholder 
Hemen Holding owned by John Fredriksen, Golden Ocean has agreed to buy back Hemen 
Holding’s position in the convertible bond with a financial gain.  
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In the 4th quarter report GOGL notified that if the company did not get a financial 
restructuring it would run out of money by March and would thus not be able to meet its 
short term obligations. As a solution to this Golden Ocean announced that it was raising 
around USD 110 million in fresh equity through the issue of 180 million ordinary shares at a 
subscription price of NOK 4.10 per share.  
The company had in addition been in negotiations with its lending banks, creditors and 
shipyards in order to try to ease the financial situation. The results of these negotiations are 
that existing covenants and other loan terms have been altered with the intention of 
providing more flexibility for the company in the future.  
Finally, negotiations with the shipyards have also paid off. The company has succeeded in a 
restructuring of the contracts of 9 newbuildings, including postponement of delivery dates, 
cancellations and transfer of a number of vessels into a single purpose company which can 
be project financed. The result of the restructuring is that the financial commitments under 
the newbuilding programme are reduced by USD 350 million. Subsequently, the entire 
newbuilding programme has now secured required financing, except for 3 Kamsarmax 
newbuildings and one Capesize to be delivered in 2012. All the Kamsarmaxes have secured 
time charters with the duration of 10 years.  
And thus, although the company is still not safe, the serious threat of bankruptcy is now 
eliminated and the aim of Golden Ocean at the moment is to become a financially strong 
company with a solid cash flow well prepared for the future. 
6.1.7 What Could Golden Ocean Have Done Differently? 
The big question here is whether GOGL could have prevented the financial distress situation 
and the serious threat of bankruptcy. The main source of the distress was the market 
collapse and the plunging rates, but another crucial reason was that several of GOGL’s 
counterparties were unable to meet their obligations. As pointed out in 6.1.5 GOGL was 
perfectly aware of credit risk and had implemented a strategy where it only did business 
with highly rated counterparties. As there is no perfect hedge against credit risk, see section 
5.9, one need to take a look at what GOGL could have done differently.  
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It can be argued that since GOGL is not very active in the financial derivatives market and 
does not implement a lot of hedges, that the financial distress could have been avoided if 
the company had been more active in the hedging market. However, even though the 
company had calculated their maximum exposure, it could not have predicted the severity of 
the global financial crisis where several companies that were thought of as being financially 
strong, such as Britannia Bulk, went bankrupt.  
In addition, the fact that GOGL had a newbuilding programme extending to 35 vessels before 
the credit crunch without having secured sufficient financing may also be a reason for the 
distress situation. The market peak and record high rates encouraged GOGL to order several 
vessels. The plan was to sell some of them at or before delivery, but when the buyers went 
bankrupt and had to withdraw from the deal, GOGL had a problem. In addition to 
counterparties not being able to fulfil the purchase obligations, the group lacked financing 
for several of the vessels leading to covenant breaches and ultimately financial distress. 
 It thus seems like GOGL’s distress was due to the disastrous circumstances and the 
extensive newbuilding programme, and not as a result of the absence of hedging. And it 
seems that the only the distress situation could have been avoided, was if GOGL would have 
had a capital structure consisting entirely of equity.  
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6.2 Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA 
 
 
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA (CECO) is a diversified international holding company listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. The company is involved in a variety of shipping activities such as 
shipowning, operation, and commercial management.  
Currently (March 2009) CECO commercially operated 114 vessels, of which 43 are 
owned/financially controlled, 20 newbuildings and 51 commercially controlled. These vessels 
are distributed between the diverse segments CECO operates in including bulk, gas, chemical 
and tank.  
The gas and chemical segments are taken care of by the fully owned subsidiaries Eitzen Gas 
and the listed Eitzen Chemical ASA. Eitzen Maritime Services ASA is another fully owned 
subsidiary of CECO and provides different management services such as technical- and crew 
management, ship supply and logistics, marine equipment and insurance broking. In 
addition, CECO is the general manager of and has a 25 per cent ownership interest in the 
three limited partnership companies ParTankers I and II KS and ParTankers III AS. 
Eitzen Bulk A/S and Eitzen Bulk Shipholding A/S are the two fully owned companies taking 
care of the bulk segment of CECO. The latter is dedicated to shipowning and comprises 
activities such as the newbuilding programme, long-term tonnage leases and general 
investments within the dry bulk segment. Eitzen Bulk A/S, on the other hand, is mainly a dry 
bulk operator trading freight, with a focus on cargo and Contract of Affreightment (COA).  
6.2.1 Fleet 
Eitzen Bulk operates mainly in the Handymax, Supramax and Panamax markets controlling at 
the moment (March 2009) 61 vessels, of which two are owned/financially controlled, 42 are 
under commercial control, and 17 newbuildings. The size of the fleet varies according to the 
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need for tonnage and the company’s desired risk exposure. The vessels that are not owned 
by the company are either on long-term time charter generally with purchase options to 
Eitzen Bulk, or they are chartered in on voyage based charters.  
Table 6.4 Eitzen Bulk’s fleet by March 2009 
Segment Handysize Handy/Supramax Panamax Total 
Number of vessels 3 30 11 44 
Newbuildings 2 1 14 17 
Total 5 31 25 61 
Eitzen Bulk’s fleet consists with this primarily of small and medium sized vessels. These 
vessels are generally trading grain and minor bulk products, virtually from all over the world.  
The composition of Eitzen Bulk’s fleet suggest that the company is rather risk averse in the 
sense that the fleet is quite diversified and that the vessels are small and medium sized and 
thus more flexible with less volatile freight rates. The degree of risk aversion is also true for 
CECO as a group, where the group believes strongly in diversification as a way of spreading 
risk and hedging.  
6.2.2 Key Numbers 
2007 was a good year for the dry bulk shipping industry making CECO end the year with a 
revenue of USD 1,318 million in which Eitzen Bulk was the largest contributor comprising 
USD 713.6 million. Despite the negative trend and revenue that practically halved from 3rd to 
4th quarter, Eitzen Bulk actually managed to increase its revenue in 2008 which amounted to 
USD 721.5 million; with this Eitzen Bulk was still the largest contributor to the group’s 
aggregate revenue of USD 1,533 million.  
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Table 6.5 CECO’s key numbers in million USD 
 2008 2007 1Q 2009 1Q 2008 
CECO total value 2,336.1 2,562.3  2,252.3 n/a 
CECO total freight income 1,533  1,318  213 384.5 
CECO total net profit - 402.5 117.8  -5.9 -12 
CECO cash flow 166 250.3 113 190 
Eitzen Bulk total value 251.4 201.8 n/a n/a 
Eitzen Bulk revenue  721.5 713.6  53 177 
Eitzen Bulk EBITDA 77.1 84.3  2.1 6.9 
 
2008 was, however, a devastating year for CECO, the main reason for this is the negative 
economical environment affecting all market segments resulting in extraordinary write-
downs amounting to USD 447.5 million. This write-down was necessary in order for the book 
values to be similar to market values. Eitzen Chemical was the largest contributor to the 
write-down with USD 401.1 million, followed by Eitzen Gas and Eitzen Bulk with USD 40.9 
million and USD 5.5 million respectively. With postponements of cargoes under COAs for 
Eitzen Bulk combined with lower earnings and heavy write-downs for all segments, Camillo 
Eitzen & Co ASA ended the year 2008 with a net loss of USD 402.5 million.  
The revenue, particularly the bulk revenue was rather low in the 1st quarter of 2009 
compared to the previous year. The revenue had been reduced by around 70 per cent due to 
lower rates and reduced activity. This further suggests that the high revenue from 2008 was 
mainly as a result of the record high rates in the first part of the year. Even though CECO 
took a loss of over USD 400 million, the cash flow has been relatively stable; the reasons for 
this are less debt repayment, increased proceeds from sale of vessels and increased 
impairment, depreciation and amortisation. 
6.2.3 Capital Structure and Taxes 
Camillo Eitzen is aiming at an equity ratio between 30 and 40 per cent. In 2007, the group’s 
equity ratio was 33 per cent, indicating a gearing ratio of 67 per cent. In 2008 on the other 
hand, CECO did not achieve its goal and the equity ratio decreased to 16 per cent and the 
gearing ratio thus ended up at 84 per cent, making CECO more exposed to financial distress 
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costs and interest rate risk. Accordingly, as a large firm with a high gearing ratio Camillo 
Eitzen & Co ASA is a perfect example of a firm that actively participates in the derivatives 
market, see section 4.3.   
CECO’s activities are subject to taxation under different tax schemes in various countries. 
The group’s main shipping activity is located in Singapore which requires income tax, but no 
taxes on dividends transferred to Norway. In addition, the company is subject to a corporate 
tax level of 28 per cent in Norway and 25 per cent in Denmark. The group’s capital structure 
should therefore be affected to some degree by the trade off between the benefits of tax 
and the costs of financial distress.  
6.2.4 Stock Price Development 
The performance of Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA’s share has historically been stable averaging 
just over NOK 60 during the last three years. However, the value has dropped dramatically as 
a result of the dry bulk market collapse. 
Figure 6.3 The development of CECO’s stock price during the last three years 
 
During the last three years the share reached its top of NOK 81.50 15 October 2007, which 
was more or less the same time as GOGL’s share also reached its record high. From early 
September 2008 the value started to drop dramatically and reached its bottom of NOK 8.51 
10 March 2009.  
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Table 6.6 Key numbers associated with CECO’s shares 
Share value (19 May) NOK 9.44 
Top value (October 2007) NOK 81.50 
Bottom value (March 2009) NOK 8.51 
Development last 12 months -85.03 % 
So far this year -26.29 % 
         Source: Oslo Børs 
CECO’s share is not as liquid as GOGL’s and is thus listed on the OB Match list, the number of 
shares traded so far this year amounts to just over 1 million compared to GOGL’s near 1.5 
billion. As of 19 may the share value reached NOK 9.44 implying a market value of NOK 
391.79 million (Oslo Børs). 
6.2.5 Risk Exposure 
The fact that CECO is an international player in the shipping industry makes it exposed to 
several risks divided into three main areas; notably market risk, operational risk and financial 
risk. Eitzen Bulk has over the years developed and implemented a very efficient risk 
management programme as a response to the historically volatile market. This system is 
composited by closely monitoring the market and by using contractual agreements such as 
derivatives and sensitivity analyses. As a result the company is able to accurately view its 
future commitments and exposures.  
 
6.2.5.1 Freight Rate Risk 
Market risk is closely related to the fluctuating freight rates and bunker rates, and can be 
reduced by making long-term agreements for the vessels, see section 5.2.1. CECO exploits 
this type of traditional risk management to a certain degree, especially in the chemical and 
gas segments. In the bulk segment on the other hand, there were only 2 per cent contract 
coverage in 2007, thus the rest of the bulk fleet were dependent on the volatile spot market 
using voyage charter contracts. 
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Eitzen Bulk’s short term goal is to be a leading operator in the spot market. The firm fixes 
single cargoes or Contracts of Affreightment with core customers or in the competitive spot 
market, and as of 27 February 2009, Eitzen Bulk had 13 COAs in its portfolio.  
Because of the volatile bulk market, strict and efficient exposure management is highly 
necessary, and that is why Eitzen Bulk utilises the derivatives market through the use of 
forward freight agreements (FFA) as a tool to hedge exposures. FFAs are used to hedge both 
cargo and vessel commitments, as well as for short term arbitrage purposes. 
Maximum exposure at the end of March 2009 was 619 days, at the same time 2,962 days 
were hedged against physical tonnage (COA) with the remainder of the arbitrage deals 
continuously balanced out against each other through for example profit or loss taking. 
Hence in 2008 total physical days of Eitzen Bulk were 11,668 as opposed to 9,265 the 
previous year. 
 
6.2.5.2 Bunker Price Fluctuations 
Exposure to bunker price fluctuations is an issue for all ship operating companies. As Eitzen 
Bulk’s contract structure includes spot trades as well as Contract of Affreightment (COA), the 
company is ruthlessly exposed to the highly volatile prices of bunker fuel, see section 5.2.1.  
Eitzen Bulk’s risk management strategy encourages hedging, and all fuel consumption on 
future cargo contract commitments have been, and will continue to be hedged. Bunker fuel 
exposure is generally reduced through compensation clauses in contracts with clients.  
CECO will enter bunker swaps, if this is considered appropriate, as a way of managing bunker 
price risk. As part of the group’s exposure management policy, the bunker hedges are 
entered simultaneously with the COAs. The bunker hedges cover the bunker expenses in 
connection with the COA and the duration of the bunker hedge is therefore similar to the 
duration of the Contract of Affreightment.  
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6.2.5.3 Exchange Rate Risk 
It is the strategy of CECO to finance the vessel in the same currency as the income and the 
underlying value of the vessel, this is in section 5.4.1 explained as a natural hedge. CECO’s 
reporting currency is USD, and the group’s revenue, expenses and the dominant values of 
the vessels are predominantly in USD, except for local costs in local currencies. The majority 
of the vessels are financed in USD, there are however, some vessels that receive their 
income in EUR and these will accordingly be financed in EUR. Furthermore, as the group has 
offices in Denmark and Norway, administration costs here are denominated in DKK and NOK 
respectively.  Because of this, the group is exposed to some currency-related risks involved 
in income in USD and EUR and administration costs in NOK and DKK. 
CECO is aiming at hedging 50 per cent of the currency risk related to the budgeted general 
and administration costs within the gas, bulk and corporate segments in DKK and NOK for 
2009. The exposure will be hedged through the use of foreign exchange forward contracts.  
The group’s subsidiaries Eitzen Chemical (ECHEM) and Eitzen Gas had some newbuilding 
programmes in JPY. Currency swaps were entered in order to manage these exposures. In 
addition, foreign exchange options were also entered in order to hedge these newbuilding 
instalments; this gave CECO an option to call JPY/put USD at given exchange rates. But as 
these newbuildings are now cancelled, the currency derivatives have been terminated.  
In addition, CECO, Eitzen Chemical and Eitzen Maritime Services have all issued bonds in 
NOK. These bonds are hedged to USD and interest rate at USD/LIBOR/EURIBOR for the 
entire duration of the bond tenor using interest currency swap agreements. CECO’s bond 
loan amounts to NOK 300 million and in order to match the payments of this bond two 
interest currency swaps of NOK 150 million each have been entered, one with fixed rates 
and one with floating.  
CECO’s sensitivity analysis shows that a 10 per cent appreciation of the USD against EUR, 
NOK and DKK would have increased CECO’s profit before tax by USD 7.0 million in 2008.  
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6.2.5.4 Interest Rate Risk 
The group’s exposure to interest rate risk is related to the long-term debt with floating 
interest rates. As outlined in 5.5 the company’s gearing ratio will be vital to its interest rate 
exposure.  
As part of CECO’s strategy which aims at securing 40 to 60 per cent of its interest rate 
exposure, the group hedges its exposure through a combination of total bank debt hedge 
and through fixed financial lease structures, as well as by utilising interest rate hedges.  
The hedges are completed through regular interest rate swaps and currency interest swaps 
and through the utilisation of financial leases, which also limit the interest rate exposures 
since the leases are at a fixed level throughout the leasing period.  
In 2007 CECO entered an interest rate swap with Nordea Markets of USD 50 million with 
fixed rates. This was amended in February with an option to extend the agreement and in 
addition the fixed rate was reduced from 3.91 to 3.39 per cent. 
As of 31 December 2008, USD 202 million of the group’s bank and bond debt was hedged 
through various interest hedges. At the same time USD 339 million was hedged through 
fixed financial lease structures. CECO’s aim was thus met as 42 per cent of the debt carried 
fixed interest rates. 
The sensitivity analysis performed by CECO has calculated that a 1.5 per cent increase in 
interest rates in 2008 would have increased CECO’s profit before tax by USD 13.5 million. 
 
6.2.5.5 Credit Risk 
The Group is exposed to credit risk through freight income and derivatives contracts in the 
sense that the counterparties are unable to pay when due, and additionally through paid 
instalments on newbuildings where for instance the ship yard goes bankrupt and is unable to 
deliver the vessel. 
As a way of mitigating credit exposure the group is putting substantial efforts into credit 
analysis of counterparties and aims at trading only with creditworthy counterparties. CECO 
has as an additional security implemented a policy of keeping the bill of lading on board until 
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payments are received, and the company can thus take arrest in the cargo if the freight is 
not paid before the cargo has been discharged. Nevertheless, a default of a charterer will 
always impose a potential loss for the company.  
Credit risk on payments on newbuildings are being reduced by a refund guarantee from 
creditworthy banks, although several of the newbuilding contracts were acquired second-
hand and due to appreciated value of the contracts a higher price than contracted was paid. 
And the value exceeding the contracted price is not supported by the refund guarantee, and 
CECO is therefore exposed to credit risk by the yard building the vessel.  
Credit risk concerning default on derivative contracts are managed by only entering 
derivative financial instruments with highly rated financial institutions, resulting in an 
acceptable level of credit risk. Due to the global economic downturn resulting in liquidity 
issues and bankruptcies for several companies of all industries, Eitzen Bulk has been forced 
to increase its focus on counterparty risk. 
6.2.6 Consequences of the Financial Crisis 
As the freight rates dropped in all segments leading to reduced estimated future earnings 
and thus reduced market values for the vessels, CECO had to perform a considerable write-
down of vessel values to match the market values. This was the main reason for CECO’s 
significant net loss of USD 402.5 million. Hence, the reduced freight rates towards the end of 
the year did not have such a significant effect on the group’s total revenue. However, in the 
1st quarter of 2009 the revenue was severely affected. 
Since the shipping market as a whole was brutally influenced by the financial turmoil as the 
demand declined combined with overcapacity, falling stock prices for CECO was inevitable. 
The value of CECO’s shares declined amazingly 89.6 per cent from the top in 2007. 
Moreover, 15 February 2009 CECO reported that the company had violated two out of six 
covenants for the Eitzen Gas loan. On top of this, Eitzen Bulk reported a loss as a result of 
the decline of the dry bulk market and potential but unrealized losses on future contracts, a 
provision worth of USD 14 million was thus taken due to the postponement of cargoes under 
COAs. 
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The challenging shipping markets in which Camillo Eitzen as a group operates has made the 
company being forced to make redundancies in order to cut costs. In a press release 
published 25 March 2009, CECO reported that in order to adapt to the current market 
situation the company will have to let 17 out 106 shore based employees go. The group’s 
aim is to achieve a 20 per cent cost cut due to the current situation and net loss, and 
redundancies are a part of this strategy. 
The group has experienced low liquidity due to lower rates and less activity in all segments 
and limited ability to deleverage through sale of assets as any potential buyers lack 
financing. Hence, in order to improve liquidity CECO aims at divestment and/or rate 
improvement and try to deleverage through sale of assets.  
As of 8 April 2009, CECO and Eitzen Chemical were in discussions with its lenders with the 
purpose of adjusting the debt repayment schedule and to alter the covenant structure in 
order to better match the current market environment. In addition, the group has cancelled 
all the newbuildings except for the two dry bulk vessels which will not be delivered until 
2011 and 2013 anyway and thus will not need financing just yet. The cancellations were 
either possible because the yards had accepted too many orders than they could possibly 
deliver, or CECO had to pay penalty clauses. 
Falling stock prices, covenant breaches, redundancies and losses are all examples of financial 
distress as outlined in 4.2.3 Hence it can be said that the global financial crisis has resulted in 
financial distress for Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA. And the group has tried to deal with this in 
terms of selling assets, negotiate with creditors and cutting costs.  
6.2.7 What Could Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA Have Done Differently? 
As Eitzen Bulk mainly operates in the COA and spot market it is exposed to fluctuating freight 
rates. The company could have, in order to secure future earnings, implemented a more 
conservative chartering policy with more focus on long-term time charters. However, the 
firm would still have been subject to credit risk and might have ended up in financial distress 
in any case as a lot of time charters entered before the collapse have now either been 
cancelled or renegotiated at lower freight rate levels.  
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When considering EBITDA for the various segments from the annual report of 2008 it is clear 
that the bulk segment was fairly stable whereas the gas segment experienced a reduced 
EBITDA, Eitzen Chemical and EMS on the other hand reported increased EBITDA. The group’s 
aggregate EBITDA saw a slight increase as a result of the diverse segment reductions and 
increases which perfectly illustrates the offsetting effects of a diversification strategy. 
However, due to the considerable write-downs in the gas and chemical segments, the group 
ended up with a gigantic total net loss. Without these two segments in its portfolio, and if 
CECO only had been focusing on dry bulk and maritime services, the group might perhaps 
have been better off.  
 
6.3 Summary 
 
This case study has now analysed the two dry bulk shipping companies Golden ocean group 
Ltd and Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA in order to see what sort of risk management instruments 
they use in practice.  
The results show that GOGL is a rather traditional shipping company regarding the type of 
contracts. Hence, GOGL performs risk management by focusing on long-term time charters 
for its vessels. The group does not implement a lot of hedges, and only enters FFAs 
occasionally for hedging or speculating purposes, but other than that the group is not very 
active in the derivatives market and thus leave most positions un-hedged. GOGL has lately 
had problems with financial distress as a result of the global financial crisis, the main reason 
for this situation is the extensive newbuilding programme  combined with counterparties 
being unable to meet their obligations to pay when due. 
CECO, on the other hand, is a more risk averse and diversified company which actively 
participates in the derivatives market. CECO implements hedges associated with interest 
rate risk, freight rate risk, bunker price risk and currency risk. The types of contracts most 
commonly used are forwards and swaps, forward contracts are entered concerning freight, 
currency, and bunker price risk, whereas swaps are entered in order to minimise interest 
rate exposures. Even though CECO is very active in the derivatives market and have a strict 
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hedging strategy, the company still ended up in financial distress as a consequence of the 
world financial crisis. The main reason for the distress was owing to severe write-downs of 
asset values which was a direct result of the plunging freight rates. 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This thesis suggests that since shipping is such a high-risk industry riddled with cyclicality, 
volatility, seasonality and unpredictability in general, risk management is very important. 
The thesis has identified that the most significant risk factors for shipowners are freight rate 
risk followed by bunker price risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, and more recently 
credit risk has gained increasing focus due to the worldwide financial downturn.  
Traditional and modern types of risk management are available in order to reduce the risk 
exposure. Traditional risk management includes entering long-term time charters in order to 
secure a stable and predictable income. The modern type of risk management however, 
includes activities in the derivatives market and is also referred to as hedging. The market 
agent takes the opposite position of his exposure in the physical market so that the two will 
offset each other and thus reduce a potential loss. There are four basic derivative 
instruments, these include futures, forwards, options and swaps, and they all have their own 
distinctive features. In addition, this thesis justifies hedging as it reduces the volatility of the 
cash flows and reduces distress costs and the probability of bankruptcy. 
In order to see what sort of hedging instruments are being employed in practice, the two dry 
bulk shipping companies Golden Ocean Group Ltd and Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA have been 
analysed. The results show that the two companies are rather different regarding their risk 
management strategies. Golden Ocean is relatively conservative and enters mainly long-
term time charters. Eitzen Bulk, on the other hand, focuses on contracts of affreightment 
and the spot market. What is more is that Camillo Eitzen as a group is rather active in the 
derivatives market hedging freight, bunkers, exchange rates and interest rates, whereas 
Golden Ocean only enters Forward Freight Agreements occasionally.  
This thesis has also been looking at the dry bulk collapse that appeared towards the end of 
2008 mainly as a result of excess supply of vessels and declining demand for sea transport as 
the global financial crisis enlarged. It is interesting to see that, regardless of their strategies, 
both companies have experienced financial distress as a result of the crisis. Golden Ocean’s 
distress is mainly a result of failing counterparties, whereas it was the extensive write-down 
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of vessel value due to the plunging freight rates that have caused distress for Camillo Eitzen. 
As the two companies have different hedging strategies, it seems that hedging will not 
prevent a financial distress situation as the world is in a financial crisis. If the circumstances 
had been normal, however, the results might have been different. 
Consequently, it seems that as long as there is a global financial crisis negatively affecting all 
industries, hedging will not prevent financial distress and bankruptcy. The only thing that 
could make a difference in a world in crisis is the gearing ratio. Thus an all equity company is 
the only company that will not be affected as severely by a financial crisis and can therefore 
take advantage of the low vessel prices and buy cheap now in order to sell later for an 
escalated price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
8. References 
 
Almeida, H. and Philippon, T., 2007. The Risk- Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress. The Journal 
Of Finance, Vol. LXII, 6 December 2007. EBSCO Host [Online] Available at: 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=6&sid=c5f37bef-f5cc-4904-bf49-
3a036725b833%40sessionmgr3 [Accessed 25 may 2009] 
 
Bernrud, E, Filbeck, G, Upton, T.R., 2005: Derivatives and Risk Management. [e-book] 
Dearborn Trade, A Kaplan Professional Company. Available at University Library/ebrary: 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/agder/docDetail.action?docID=10155082 [Accessed 18 February 
2009] 
 
Bjørndal, B., 2009. Golden Ocean Klinker Til. Dagens Næringsliv [internet] 25 May. Available 
at: http://www.dn.no/forsiden/resultater/article1676179.ece [Accessed 28 May 2009] 
 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. And Marcus, A.J., 2008: Investments. 7th edn. McGraw-Hill International 
Edition 
 
Buckley, A., 2004: Multinational Finance. 5th edn. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited 
 
BunkerWorld, 2009. Chuan, C., Christina.Chua@bunkerworld.com. Price Chart. [E-mail] 
Message to Linda Korsfur (lkorsf03@student.uia.no) Sent Thursday 2 April 2009, 08:24 am.  
 
Byberg, Ø. 2009. Tredobling fra Bunn. Hegnar Online [internet] February 9. Available at 
http://www.hegnar.no/bors/shipping/article359180.ece 
 
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA, 2008: Annual Report 2008. [Online] Available at: 
http://www2.eitzen-group.com/data/File/CECO/CECO%20Annual%20report%202008(1).pdf 
 
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA, 2007: Annual Report 2007. [Online] Available at: 
http://hugin.info/135041/R/1219441/255911.pdf 
 
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA, 2009: 1st Quarter Report 2009. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.camillo-
eitzen.com/index.php?pk_menu=223&feed=Uk9ITQQQbyI1MGotMyAhJyUlICQgKn4yPT57Fn
lma2xqb21yDg1PU1JTXVVTSFlaW11ZVVxBCBwe&action=view [Accessed 20 May 2009] 
  
Camillo Eitzen & Co ASA, 2008: 4th Quarter Report 2008. [Online] Available at: 
http://hugin.info/135041/R/1293778/293250.pdf 
 
Camillo Eitzen, 2009. [Online] Available at: http://www.camillo-eitzen.com/ 
 
Clarkson (RSL) Research Services Limited, 2009: Dry Bulk Trade Outlook February 2009. 
Volume 15, NO. 2. [Online] Available at: http://www.crsl.com/  
 
83 
 
DN, 2008. Spår Nedtur i Tørrbulk. Dagens Næringsliv [internet] 4 February. Available at: 
http://www.dn.no/forsiden/naringsliv/article1306857.ece  
 
DNV, 2009. Det Norske Veritas: DNV Bulk Carrier Update NO. 1 – 2009. [internet] Available 
at: 
http://www.dnv.com/industry/maritime/publicationsanddownloads/publications/dnvbullkc
arrierupdate/2009/2009/ [Accessed 10 May 2009] 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2007: Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended 
December 31, 2007. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.goldenocean.no/reports/135378/R/1246508/269569.pdf 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2008: Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended 
December 31, 2008. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.goldenocean.no/reports/135378/R/1310375/303089.pdf 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2009: Interim Report March 2009. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.goldenocean.no/IR/ [Accessed 25 May 2009] 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2008: Preliminary Fourth Quarter and Financial Year 2008 
Results. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.goldenocean.no/reports/135378/R/1293463/293033.pdf 
 
Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2009. [Online] Available at: www.goldenocean.no 
 
Grinblatt, M. and Titman, S., 2002: Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy. 2nd edn. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
IMAREX ASA, 2009. [Online] Available at: www.imarex.com 
 
International Maritime Organization, 2006: International Shipping Carrier of World Trade. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/uploads/File/worldtradeflyer.pdf 
 
Kavussanos, M.G., 2002: ‘Business Risk Measurement and Management in the Cargo 
Carrying Sector of the Shipping Industry’. Ch. 30 in Grammenos, Costas TH. (ed.): Handbook 
of Maritime Economics and Business, pp 661-692. London: LHH 
 
Kavussanos, M.G. & Visvikis, I.D., 2006a: Derivatives and Risk Management in Shipping. 1st 
edn. London: Witherbys Publishing. 
 
Kavussanos, M.G. & Visvikis, I.D., 2006b: ‘Shipping Freight Derivatives: a survey of recent 
evidence’. From Maritime Policy and Management, July 2006 VOL. 33, NO. 3, pp 233-255. 
London: Routledge.  
 
84 
 
Korteweg, A., 2007. The Costs of Financial Distress across Industries. [Online] Available at 
SSRN at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945425 [Accessed 25 May 
2009] 
 
Leung, W., 2009. Pacific Basin expects more Dry-Bulk failures as Rates Collapse. Bloomberg 
[internet] 13 January. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agVL835jRdBQ [Accessed 29 
January] 
 
Madura, J. and Fox, R., 2007: International Financial Management. London: Thomson 
Learning 
 
Nightingale, A., 2009: Half of Commodity Shippers May Breach Loans by April, RBS Says. 
Bloomberg [internet] 14 January. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4_KsvpSdIRc 
 
Nomikos, N.K. & Alizadeh, A.H., 2002: ‘Risk Management in the Shipping Industry: Theory 
and Practice’. Ch. 31 in Grammenos, Costas TH. (ed.): Handbook of Maritime Economics and 
Business, pp 693-729. London: LHH 
 
Oslo Børs, 2009. [Online] Available at: www.oslobors.no   
 
Platou, 2008: The Platou Report 2008. R.S Platou ASA. Available at:  
http://www.platou.com/loadfileservlet/loadfiledb?id=1205311719484PUBLISHER&key=120
5499801725 
  
Platou, 2009: The Platou Report 2009. R.S. Platou ASA. Available at:  
http://www.platou.com/loadfileservlet/loadfiledb?id=1235645222062PUBLISHER&key=123
6854479218  
 
X-rates, 2009. [Online] Available at: http://www.x-rates.com/d/NOK/USD/graph120.html 
[Accessed 15 May 2009] 
 
Ross, S.A., Westerfield, R.W. and Jaffe, J.F., 2002: Corporate Finance. 6th edn. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Saugestad, E., gold_esa@goldenocean.no, 2009. Risikostyring. [E-mail] Message to Linda 
Korsfur (lkorsf03@student.uia.no) Sent Friday 20 March 2009, 2:25 pm. 
 
Shipping Facts, 2009. Information about the international shipping industry, [Online] 
Available at: http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/ [Accessed 16 February 2009] 
 
Shipping Times, 2008: Bulk Shipping Firm Goes to the Wall. Shipping Times [internet] 19 
December. Available at: http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item_10199.html 
 
Stopford, M., 2009: Maritime Economics, 3rd edn, London: Routledge 
 
85 
 
Stopford, M., 2008: The Great Shipping Boom 2003-8 Can we avoid a great shipping slump? 
Fifth City Biennial Meeting 18-19th November 2008. EBSCO Host [Online] Available at: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/Login.aspx?lp=login.asp&ref=&authtype=ip,uid [Accessed 4 
February 2009] 
 
Stopford, M., 1997: Maritime Economics, 2nd edn. London: Routledge 
 
The Baltic Exchange, 2009. [Online] Available at: www.balticexchange.com  
 
The Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd, 2009 [online] Available at: 
http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=3 [Accessed 7 February 
2009] 
 
Tsuneishi Group (Zhoushan) Shipbuilding INC. [Online] Available at: http://www.tsuneishi-
zs.com/en/products/kamsarmax.html [Accessed 10 March 2009] 
 
UNCTAD, 2008: Review of Maritime Transport 2008, report by UNCTAD secretariat, UNITED 
NATIONS PUBLICATION, New York and Geneva. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2008_en.pdf 
